Journal of Administration Overseas

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VOLUME X/NUMBER 3/July 1971

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by Peter Wass

Provincial Development Committees in Zambia
by R. G. Rainford

Fijian Administration during the past decade
by Peter France

BOOK REVIEWS
by Professor Bryan Keith Lucas, Professor Walter Elkan, A. H. M. Kirk-Greene, Raymond Nottage, George Franklin, F. H. Woodrow, J. H. M. Beattie

Published for the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Overseas Development Administration

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Published by

Her Majesty's Stationery Office

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Brazennose Street, Manchester M60 8AS 50 Fairfax Street, Bristol BS1 3DE

258 Broad Street, Birmingham B1 2HE 80 Chichester Street, Belfast BT1 4JY

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Editor's Notes

MAJOR problems of rural development are not confined to the Third World. In Britain, for example, the Highlands of Scotland have long provided a well-nigh intractable problem for successive governments – ever since the Nineteenth Century evictions destroyed the erstwhile clan loyalties and obligations.

Peter Wass' thoughtful and perceptive study, particularly of the sympathetic, grass roots and by no means unsuccessful efforts of the Crofters Commission in the Fifties and Sixties, provides some guidelines that may be of value to policy makers elsewhere faced with the difficulty of seeking to improve the lot of those who live in rough, tough (albeit often beautiful) regions of the world.

In furthering rural development in Zambia, Provincial Development Committees, chaired by a resident Cabinet Minister, have been given a special watchdog role to ensure that plan implementation runs smoothly, and to this end they have been provided with special "bottleneck" funds to facilitate the execution of projects where an unforeseen blockage has held up progress. R. G. Rainford examines the "informal consequences" of these committees and assesses their effectiveness which he feels depends very much on the control exerted by the chairman. As a spur to officials who are required to report progress, he has no doubt as to their value.

In the first of several articles we will be publishing on the Pacific area, Dr. France looks at the closing decade prior to Fiji achieving independence. He examines the importance of the Burns Commission and in conclusion he draws attention to the conservative attitudes to change still evinced in the more traditional Fijian Provinces, in contrast to the more radical go-ahead approach adopted where a more egalitarian form of society has evolved.

On the Continent of Africa today local government tends to lie under rather sharp and questioning political scrutiny; blame for failure to balance the budget, for failure to provide adequately efficient services, is invariably placed on Councillors and their staff. As Mr. Olaloku makes clear, in the State of Western Nigeria (where government grants and loans alone have saved local authorities from bankruptcy) the cause of the ever-widening revenue/expenditure gap is only in part due to the faults of local authorities (inefficient tax administration, reluctance to introduce new property taxes, etc.), at least equally they seem due to failure by the central authorities to ensure that local government is provided with the financial wherewithal with which to undertake functions which the centre has imposed upon them by statute. Certainly no local authority can be blamed for the ill-effects accruing where a state government fails to pay out from its coffers the agreed and lawful contribution upon which a local authority depends for salary and service purposes!

Finally, Mr. Barakbah examines the situation, common to so many developing countries, created by the illegal urban squatter. He does not believe that mere enforcement of the penal clauses of the Malaysian National Land Code can provide a realistic answer to a major social problem. He would like to see his government extend the steps it is already taking so as to deal with squatting as part of a comprehensive programme for urban betterment.

Rural Development in the Highlands of Scotland:

Some Features of the Role of the Crofters Commission

By PETER WASS

Mr. Wass is lecturer in the Department of Educational Studies at Edinburgh University

In recent months international thinking has shown an increasing interest in rural development. This shift from an over-concentration on urban problems is to be welcomed, even though it has been delayed so long. "Adult Education and Rural Development" was the theme of a European conference[1], UNESCO sponsored an East African Seminar at Moshi, Tanzania, on the "Integrated approach to rural development", and a British working group produced a report[2] on the topic. At these and other recent meetings, two important features have been underlined: the rural sector demands far more careful attention from development administrators than it has had in the past, and secondly that to conceive needs in terms only of improved agriculture is, to say the least, a limited policy. In Britain since World War II there has been tremendous progress in agriculture, both in techniques and organization, an improvement for which the agricultural advisory services may fairly claim some of the credit. Extension work, especially on the individual level, is well thought out and ably performed, and this experience has been most successfully drawn upon in many developing countries. But the needs of rural society go much wider than improved agricultural techniques.

It can be argued that the high degree of specialization of services reached in Britain is at present not a very helpful experience for those countries that are now seeking an integrated approach to rural development planning. A further limitation has been that concepts of "planning" and "development" have had a stunted growth due to the widespread application of the terms in the field of Town and Country Planning[3], a field which has emphasized control at the expense of a more constructive approach, and which has been heavily committed to urban and semi-urban problems.

It may be significant, however, that it is in one of the least developed areas of Britain that some of the most interesting rural development work is being done. For the first time for generations there are encouraging signs that a new lease of life is beginning to unfold in the Highlands and Islands of

[1]Organised by the European Bureau of Adult Education, and held at the Folk High School, Barendorf, West Germany, December 1969.

[2]MINISTRY OF OVERSEAS DEVELOPMENT, *Rural Development*, Report of a Working Group, London 1969.

[3]See for example, the *Town and Country Planning (Scotland) Bill*, 1947 Comd. 7034, in which "development" means "not only the erection of buildings but also any change in the use of land or buildings". "Planning" was likewise limited in concept.

Scotland, an area of traditional economic depression, emigration and, some would say, social stagnation. Today, in the Highlands, many government administrators and voluntary organization workers are displaying a willingness to accept social change, and even to stimulate it, which has something in common with the spirit of nation-building in developing countries, and contrasts markedly with many a self-satisfied city or urban area. Without prejudice to other influences and agencies which are undoubtedly playing a part in this regeneration, the following may be noted as extremely important:

1. The establishment (1965) and subsequent dynamic action of the Highlands and Islands Development Board.
2. The devoted, highly skilled extension and advisory work of the North and West of Scotland Colleges of Agriculture.
3. The growth in the last few years of local Councils of Social Service.
4. The careful and sensitive policy and administration of the Crofters Commission.

This paper, whilst including certain references to the first three features, will focus interest on the last, as an example of an organization which displays several valuable qualities of sound administration.

Crofting

The crofting areas of Scotland stretch from the Argyllshire island of Islay in the South-west to Unst in the Shetland Isles, a distance of over 350 miles as the crow flies. The total area affected by crofting legislation is over 2 million acres. To explain fully just what is a croft involves reference to considerable historical and legal information, too lengthy to deal with here.[4] Basically it is an agricultural holding not exceeding fifty acres nor having an annual rent of over £50.[5] The crofter is the tenant of such a holding, and his tenancy is protected by special provisions.[6] In addition to security of tenure of his croft, not only for himself but for his descendants, the crofter enjoys rights in common grazing land, and depending upon local features, certain other rights such as peat-cutting and seaweed collection. Typically, a croft consists of a few acres,[7] which the crofter works part-time in addition to a non-agricultural wage-earning occupation.

The Crofters Commission

Mention of rights in land may conjure up in the mind of the reader a picture of hereditary affluence. Nothing could be further from the truth:

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[4]This information is compiled neatly and with humour, in a twenty-page booklet by Colin Macdonald, *Crofts and Crofters*, Moray Press, Edinburgh 1955.

[5]Department of Agriculture for Scotland, *Report of the Commission of Enquiry into Crofting Conditions*, H.M.S.O. 1954, p.30.

[6]The Crofters Holdings (Scotland) Act 1886 meant that:
(a) the crofter could not be evicted from his holding
(b) he could apply to the Land Court to fix a fair rent for his holding
(c) on leaving his holding he could obtain compensation from the landlord for permanent improvements. (*Ibid.* p. 12.)

[7]In 1966, of a total number of 14,940 working units, 10,454 had less than 10 acres of crops and grass, see Crofters Commission *Annual Report for* 1966 (Her Majesty's Stationery Office, Edinburgh 1967) p. 31.

the small size and often poor quality[8] of the land held by the crofter prevent him from making a viable livelihood from working his croft.[9] On account of the unique nature of the problems arising from this situation, a public body was established fifteen years ago whose responsibility is to look after the interests of crofters. The Crofters Commission[10] deserves particular attention as it combines harmoniously two aspects of administration which could conflict,[11] namely both regulatory and developmental functions. Furthermore, a discussion of the Commission's role and mode of operation is opportune at the present time as it has recently put forward some radical proposals and has also introduced greater decentralization in its own decision-making.

The 1955 Act describes the Commission's functions as "reorganizing, developing and regulating crofting".[12] Further, the Commission is charged "to keep under general review all matters relating to crofts and crofting conditions".[13] The remit seems broad enough, but the provision of this wide-ranging statutory responsibility for crofting areas is misleading if it implies that the Commission has power to deal directly with all problems that may arise. The reader could suppose that the Commission duplicates, or renders unnecessary, much of the work which a local authority normally undertakes, especially in regard to such responsibilities as attending to "the needs of crofting communities for public services".[14] However, this potential conflict was anticipated by a sub-section[15] in the Act which specifies collaboration with other bodies engaged in development in the same area. A striking feature of the Commission's operation is the extent to which it has made this collaboration a reality.[16] The Commission's Annual Reports from 1966 to 1969 all contain many detailed references to consultations, co-operation with other bodies, or expressions of opinion by local groups: reflecting an emphasis the Commission places, consciously or otherwise, on the *communications process* in development administration. By contrast, the reports of the Highlands and Islands Development Board accord collaboration and consultation no more than a position of formal acknowledgement: in this case the emphasis and concern is clearly with the Board's *achievements*. The differences run even deeper, as will be discussed later.

[8]Soils on the west coast of Scotland are largely wet and poorly drained – ideal conditions for the formation of peat, which is widespread. In some areas (e.g. Isle of Harris) rock outcrops are so near the surface, soil covering so scant, and drainage so bad, that small arable beds had to be artificially built up by the crofters, often containing large mixtures of seaweed.

[9]In 1968, only 3.6 per cent of the working units were judged to be full-time (over 274 standard man-days). Crofters Commission, *Annual Report for* 1968 (H.M.S.O. Edinburgh 1969) p.43.

[10]Referred to hereunder as "the Commission".

[11]United Nations, *A Handbook of Pubic Administration* (New York 1961) p.25.

[12]The Crofters (Scotland) Act 1955, Section 2(i), preamble.

[13]*Ibid.* Section 2(i)(a).

[14]*Loc. cit.*

[15]*Ibid.* Section 2(I)(b).

[16]For example, much of the Commission's regulatory field-work is carried out by members of the Department of Agriculture and Fisheries; the Commission assisted the Highlands and Islands Development Board with a bulb project in the Hebridean island of Uist, (Crofters Commission (1969) *op. cit.* para. 38), and in consultation with the North of Scotland College of Agriculture prepared a scheme for Highlands and Islands Development Board assistance in land improvement and bulk purchases of winter feed (*Ibid.* para. 42).

Another reason for the lack of duplication can be found in the fact that although the Commission can *review* any matters ranging from supplementary occupations to provision of industry or social amenities, its field operation in development is officially limited to agriculture. Whilst this limitation is both irksome[17] to a body which takes the holistic approach[18] to development, and indeed is inconsistent in some measure with the Commission's remit to look after the welfare of the crofter, it has encouraged a concentration of activity. Furthermore, a wider operational function could not have been implemented without strengthening the Commission's bureaucratic structure, a move which would have posed great difficulties in the division of responsibility with other authorities – notably the County Councils – and which would inevitably have removed some of the uniqueness of its organization. However, as will be shown, the Commission has interpreted its remit imaginatively, and has spread its vision and activities in some rather interesting ways.

The Commission's Functions

Basically there are two operations carried out, the first being the administration of a system of grants for improvements connected with crofting agriculture. One section of the central office organization is responsible for this and will be discussed below.

The other major operation is the regulation of land tenure. Initially the Commission had two sections dealing with this, each being responsible for a group of specialist functions. However, in 1962 an interesting change took place when these two sections were reorganized according to *geographical area:* a move away from the contemporary trend towards greater specialization of function, and one which recognized the interdependent nature of the problems occurring in any particular locality. This holistic approach has been paid considerable lip-service[19] in public service fields, though implementation has lagged. The 1962 move by the Commission has more significance than mere administrative convenience; it recognizes that the control and usage of land, albeit a basic factor in any agricultural area, should not be isolated from other aspects of community life. The area organization and representation[20] gives this view a practical dimension.

Agricultural Development

Financial grants provide the standard means through which the Commission can aid and develop agricultural production.[21] These may be considered in three groups:

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[17]Verbal communication from Commission's Chairman, James Shaw Grant, C.B.E.

[18]The term has been used recently to indicate an approach which consciously refuses to be strictly limited by organisational boundaries, and which seeks to identify and capitalise upon the relationship between physical, social and economic aspects of a given situation.

[19]See for example, United Nations, *Community Development and National Development*, 1963.

[20]Excluding the Chairman, each of the six members of the Commission represents a crofting area. Delegation of functions to Area Commissioners is discussed later in the paper. Representation is also afforded through the 105 Assessors, who are local people with experience in crofting affairs, whose function is also discussed later.

[21]Crofters Commission (1969) *op. cit.* para. 94.

1. MARGINAL CROPPING GRANTS[22] awarded according to a standard scale in relation to the "marginality" of the land. Thus the poorest areas receive £11 per acre, and better areas £8 and £5 respectively. Where land is considered to be already in good heart, no grant is obtainable from the Commission. This scheme operates very smoothly and fairly extensively: in 1968 the grants covered over 42,000 acres cropped at a cost to the Commission of £273,114.[23]
2. LAND IMPROVEMENT GRANTS designed to upgrade the grazing lands. In the first type of improvement, regeneration treatment of the surface is required, involving the application of specified quantities of lime, fertilizer and grass-seed. RECLAMATION grants, however, require a more thorough-going operation, including cultivation of the soil by plough or rotorator, followed by sowing of grass, and application of lime and fertilizer.
3. GRANTS FOR OTHER IMPROVEMENTS such as fences, roads, drainage, water supplies and certain agricultural equipment.

None of these grants is automatically paid out to any eligible crofter. The emphasis is placed first on his initiative in making application, and then on his willingness and ability to undertake the stipulated improvements, only on satisfactory completion of which does he receive payment.

The Individual and the Community

To the sociologist or anthropologist one of the most interesting features of development in the crofting areas is the interaction between the individual and his local community. Traditionally communal organization was strong and in many areas is still very evident in economic activity, though less so – perhaps significantly – in social affairs. The traditional organizational pattern has been given a modernized structure by a deliberate policy of the Commission to establish and develop Township Grazing Committees[24] which control the use of common land. In many cases these work quite adequately for routine tasks such as deciding the *souming*,[25] though even here some are ineffective. However, when one considers the question of development functions, the usefulness of this community organization is more dubious.

Nevertheless, regeneration work in some areas has been largely communal, as in the Isle of Lewis[26] where grazing committees are strong, and there are many examples of sustained and often arduous work carried out by communities in this field. Such activity is very comparable to the communal projects undertaken with government assistance in many developing

[22]This may include not only cultivated crops but also grass which is cut for hay or silage.
[23]Crofters Commission (1969) *op. cit.* p. 18.
[24]Crofters Commission, Report for 1956, H.M.S.O., 1957.
[25]Determining the total number of stock to be allowed on the common grazing, and hence the maximum numbers which individual crofters may hold.
[26]By the end of 1968, Lewis had improved a total of 7,208 acres on a township basis as opposed to 4,271 acres on an individual basis. In all other areas individual improvements far exceed township achievements. This trend is now apparent even in Lewis where since 1966 individual improvements have each year exceeded township schemes.

countries, and which are considered a valuable medium for local development. But as individuals become more self-reliant and *pari passu* less inclined to be bound by group control, this method becomes increasingly difficult to implement. The trends in more prosperous agricultural areas in the United Kingdom would indicate that the communal approach may have a limited future. Some local leaders, noting the failure of the metropolitan society to produce satisfying group and community relationships, deplore the passing of this communal approach and seek to perpetuate it, for what might be called ethical reasons – and from a social point of view they clearly have a case. However, in the long run, without an overall system which not only encourages but insists upon communal activity, the pressures of individual motivation and group processes work in the opposite direction, notably in the economic sphere.[27] Experience from many countries has shown that whilst short-term communal projects may be accomplished successfully, they may require a different form of organization for their continuation and maintenance. Supporting this view is the post-regeneration state of many township re-seeded areas where maintenance of pasture, drains and fencing has been neglected. Evidence is also provided from the more propitious crofting areas such as Tiree, where communal improvement gains little support. Officially the Commission has an open mind on the issue, and it even goes so far as to state that "communal initiative and individual initiative are not mutually exclusive".[28] Although the Commission might have difficulty in demonstrating the validity of this position in all cases, it can point to supporting evidence.

Recent trends in *land apportionment* may be cited. An enterprising crofter who wishes to improve the quality of his cattle or sheep clearly faces considerable limitations as long as his stock is pastured on communal land. To gain the control he requires he must have exclusive use of his pasture, and legal provisions exist for him to have his share of common land apportioned to him. This allows him to fence, which he can do with the assistance of a fencing grant, and to all intents and purposes he has a privately controlled farm. No claim is made that individual apportionment is desirable *per se*, but the evidence is clear enough that it does provide the structure through which more responsible stock husbandry and land management may be practised. It has, for example, led to a decrease in overstocking.

Whilst a crofter may apply for his apportionment individually, the Commission prefers to encourage what is known as *planned apportionment*, in which all members of a township agree to apportionment. In such a case, all available land is distributed equitably at the one time, with the obvious advantages to the crofters of a comprehensively planned scheme. Thus, concern about overstocking practices by one member of the township brought about such a communal initiative in a recent case on the island of Tiree.[29]

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[27]Though the pursuit of economic efficiency may prove to be ill-judged, as indicated by Misham, E. J., *Growth: the price we pay*, Staples Press 1969.
[28]Crofters Commission (1968) *op. cit.* p. 22.
[29]Communication from the Chief Technical Officer of the Crofters Commission.

From tenant to owner-occupier

For some years the Commission has been aware that the programme of improvements mentioned above, though significant, has not attacked the roots of the general "malaise" of the crofting areas. Consequently, in 1968 it submitted proposals to the Secretary of State for Scotland which if implemented "will represent the most important reform in crofting since the first Crofters Act of 1886".[30] The central proposal is to convert crofting tenure to owner-occupation – in effect to put the crofters on the same footing as any other small owner-farmers in Britain. They will thus be released from existing restrictions which inhibit changes in land use and the development of non-agricultural activities on their plots. Apart from the purely economic issues at stake here, there are social implications. If the change in legislation takes place, how far is it consistent to have at the same time control over the sale of plots? The present policy, and the proposed changes, are tacitly based on the concept of improving life for existing crofters and their natural succesors – an evolutionary process leading to development of the community through development of its members. With land becoming available on the open market, fears have been expressed that "outside" exploiters and entrepreneurs will quickly obtain plots, and that the results will be socially undesirable: increase of absentee landowners, growing number of holiday cottages empty for most of the year, uncontrolled development for tourism such as caravan parks, decline of agriculture, loss of group cohesiveness and social control. If this process did in fact take place, crofters who had not sold up in the early stages could well soon find themselves as misfits in the changing social structure and feel obliged to move elsewhere. In sum, those who should have benefitted from the change could end up as losers. The Commission is aware of this possibility, and has stated firmly that any decision must be based on the principle of the "advantage of the crofter."[31]

Of particular interest to the present study is the way in which the Commission moved towards their decision to submit proposals. The original initiative, in fact, did not belong to them, but rather to the Federation of Crofters' Unions who passed a resolution that crofters should be given the right to become owner-occupiers. Consistent with their belief in taking seriously any group expressions of opinion by crofters, the Commission discussed this Resolution in considerable detail at the Assessors Conference in 1967, but nevertheless deliberately did not come to a decision until the question had been discussed even more extensively at both central and local levels.[32] They were bold and honest enough to set out the arguments for and against the change in their published Annual Report for 1967 with the issue yet to be decided.

In late 1968 over thirty public meetings[33] took place in different areas at which the crofters themselves felt free to discuss the changes and their implications.

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[30]Crofters Commission (1969) *op. cit.* p. 1.
[31]Crofters Commission (1968) *op. cit.* p. 11.
[32]*Ibid.*
[33]Communication from J. R. Spence, Information Officer to the Crofters Commission.

This exercise in functional adult education[34] was further supported by soundings carried out through grazings committees and other local groups. Informal feedback indicated heavy support in nearly all cases. Overall then, a constructive dialogue took place through a network of consultative channels, resulting in an informed and widespread body of opinion amongst the people most affected by the proposed changes. This contrasts with recent more naive attempts of city planning agencies to obtain citizen participation through the medium of large public meetings, at which communication between the thought-processes of politicians and architect-planners on the one hand, and average citizens on the other, is likely to be minimal.[35]

Delegation, Communication and Consultation

One of the threads running through the policy and operation of the Commission's work over the years has been the philosophy that each area, with its people, problems and potentialities, is unique. This does not mean that in many cases wider regional or national considerations may not be the overriding factors. It does, however, mean that the Commission, within the boundaries of its statutory remit and the existing legal framework, does not adopt an *a priori* position regarding individual questions, but pays considerable attention to local variables. Thinking at international level is now moving towards this point of view[36], having been somewhat disillusioned with the "blueprint" approach to development. For example, after several years' experience of an intensive rural development project in South India, the Norwegian leader concluded that the main lesson for future projects was that local culture and social organisation should be given greater prominence in planning[37].

The 1962 re-organisation of the administrative structure according to area, referred to above, was a major practical step in furtherance of this "philosophy of experience". Decentralisation was taken further in late 1969, when several essential functions of the Commission were delegated to individual Commissioners in respect of their areas. These include the approving of croft assignations, sub-divisions, letting, renouncing of tenancy, appointing Grazings Committees, and apportionment of grazings. Before delegation these cases were prepared for submission to the full Commission meeting which might not be held for several weeks, and a minute of the discussions had to be recorded. Now, on receipt of the application, the Commissioner for the area makes his own decision which can be put into effect immediately. An added advantage is that Commission meetings, freed from the time-consuming *minutiae* of individual cases, can rightly be devoted to matters of policy.

Unlike a county administration, for example, the Commission does not operate its own "committee" system. However, it is in close touch with

[34]Using the term to indicate those activities and processes through which people are assisted to a more perceptive awareness of problems affecting them.

[35]Realising this need, the United Kingdom Government commissioned a study under the chairmanship of Mr Arthur Skeffington (People and Planning, H.M.S.O. 1969). The proposals of the report had already been preceded in practice by the Crofters Commission.

[36]See for example, United Nations, *Local participation in development planning*, 1967.

[37]Klausen, A. M., *Kerala Fishermen and the Indo-Norwegian Pilot Project*, Allen and Unwin 1968, p. 183.

over 700 local committees, known as Grazings Committees, which are elected by crofters in the townships. These units provide a most important channel of communication and enable the Commission to be in touch with the "grass-roots" in a way which the County Councils and the Highlands and Islands Development Board are not. In some respects such committees are similar to the Village Development Committees established through community development programme in many parts of anglophone Africa, and which likewise assisted communication from government to village and *vice versa*. It is not without relevance in this context to note the dissatisfaction with the present district council structure expressed in the Wheatley Commission's Report.[38] The report acknowledges the important role to be played by very localised bodies, and the experience of parish councils in England shows that such bodies, have as much, if not more, relevance in the second half of the 20th century than they did in the first.

Without suggesting that Grazings Committees provide a model for community or neighbourhood councils – indeed, most members would probably be horrified at the idea – it is felt that those concerned with restructuring local government might learn some useful lessons from the experience of these crofters' organisations. It must be added however, that although Grazings Committees are useful as channels of communication, they may often fail to be effective as executive bodies controlling and improving land use.[39]

Further measures to improve communication are set out in an interestingly titled memorandum[40], which was attached to the Commission's submission to the Wheatley Commission. In this document, ten points are raised several of which have been discussed in the foregoing paragraphs. Considerable emphasis is placed on the Panel of Assessors which is elected and is representative of all the crofting areas in the Highlands and Islands. In 1968 the total number of assessors was 105. They are elected locally and are usually people who have long experience of their own area and its crofting problems, or are able to contribute some particular skill or professional expertise as for example in the case of an agriculturalist or veterinary surgeon. The panel meets annually at a conference in Inverness and from time to time area conferences of assessors are held to deal with particular local problems. The Commission claims that this panel of assessors provides a two-way channel of communication between itself and the general body of crofters. Certainly the structure of the panel of assessors would indicate that such communication is indeed possible, since considerable care is taken to choose assessors from every local crofting area. However, what is less clear is how in fact this communication functions and it would be most helpful to have some systematic research into the nature of communication between crofter and the Commission. Several personal field impressions have indicated that functionally the communication is not so efficient as the Commission would imagine.

[38] *Royal Commission on Local Government in Scotland*, H.M.S.O., 1969, p. 37.
[39] Bruce, R. H. W., Crofters Commissioner for Shetland, in a Further Education Lecture, February 1968, p. 4.
[40] "*Measures taken by the Crofters Commission to overcome the difficulties of disseminating information, maintaining adequate consultation and securing optimum local participation in decision making.*"

For example, discussion with various groups of crofters as to what is the role of the assessor and how crofters might use him, revealed considerable vagueness, differences of opinion, and open doubt as to his value. It should of course be remembered that many if not most of the assessors are crofters themselves.

Communication between the Commission and the Highland and Island Development Board [41] is considerable: a liaison committee meets every few months and also there are *ad hoc* meetings from time to time to deal with particular questions, as for example in the setting up of the bulb scheme in North Uist already mentioned. One cannot study the two bodies very long without becoming acutely aware of their very different methods of working; possibly in part the result of their terms of reference. The Board has a general remit for overall development, and has shown a leaning towards large scale industrial development. The Commission on the other hand has a remit limited to crofting and to crofting agriculture and its operation is therefore concerned with the smaller type of development. Methods of communication are different: the Board has no area representatives who might fulfil a function parallel to that of either the Grazing Committees or the Assessors or indeed the Crofters Commissioners themselves – public communication therefore tends to emanate from the Board's office in Inverness via television, the press and their own handouts. This lack of a local arm or link would appear to be an important factor in the misunderstanding of, and even antagonism to, the Board's activities and policies which is often encountered at local level.[42] From another standpoint, less articulate groups have no effective means of making their views known to the Board. A further contrast between the two bodies concerns co-operation with other organisations. As is pointed out above the Commission is specifically charged to co-operate with local bodies, and does so, as we have seen, in full measure. The Board has no such remit[43] and appears to place less emphasis on consultation and collaboration with local organisations, both public and private. Examination of relevant press reports during the past few years indicates a tendency of the Board to publicise its own activities and achievements, whereas the Crofters Commission is more concerned to publicise the changes taking place in the crofting areas. The different emphases bear reflection.

Consultation is a time consuming business, but it is essential if the willing and active co-operation of the crofters is to be obtained. The Commission is mainly concerned, both by remit and inclination, to improve conditions for existing and future tenant-occupants of crofts. The Board however is concerned with developing the area, not necessarily with any policy as to who is doing the developing or who will benefit. Conceptually, the Commission operates according to a basically social policy, whilst the Board follows an economic one. One of the most interesting questions of relevance to the long-term future of the Highlands is to what extent these two conflict or agree with each other, and whether the present institutional structure pro-

[41] Referred to hereunder as "the Board".
[42] Personal discussions with local groups in Highlands and Islands.
[43] The Highlands and Islands Development (Scotland) Act 1965 required the establishment of a Consultative Council, however, whose function has been largely advisory to the Board.

vides the most apt framework for achieving an adequate synthesis between two emphases. Whilst the pros and cons of different value systems and development assumptions may be debated *ad infinitum* without reaching agreement, one aspect which has undoubtedly been neglected in the past is the participation of the local population. Under present arrangements, the Commission provides more adequately in this respect – though it is itself aware of various constraints which affect adversely the contribution the crofter is currently making in terms of both economic and social initiative.[44]

Councils of Social Service

That there is ample scope for new organisations to play a role in Highland development is demonstrated by the case of the island of Tiree, in which the Commission has shown some considerable interest. In 1967 the Area Crofters Commissioner had written a report on Problems and Potentialities for Agricultural Development. One result was that the Commission set up a Tiree Committee in January 1968, with the following representation: the Area Commissioner (chairman), the Senior Lands Officer, the Senior Livestock Inspector, the Area Agricultural Adviser from the West of Scotland College of Agriculture, and the Assistant Lands Development Officer from the Board. It is interesting to note that although this type of grouping of "technical" officers is comparatively novel in Britain, it is well known in former British dependent territories where district development committees or district "teams" have been used effectively to improve co-ordination in rural development. The lack of unofficial representation is defended on the grounds that the main purpose in coming together as a committee was to co-ordinate the activities of several departments and agencies. Particular objectives were (i) to raise the standards of crop and animal husbandry together with improving marketing arrangements and (ii) to re-organise the crofting structure, which in practical terms meant consolidation of land-holding.

The Committee considered that the second objective would be meaningless unless the first was achieved. The significance of this policy in a wider context may be seen when one considers the situation in several developing countries where the main problem of agricultural development is often identified as an iniquitous or unsuitable land tenure system. A logical consequence of such an analysis is that the government decides to change the land-holding system and introduces perhaps a programme of far-reaching agrarian reform. If, however, such changes take place more rapidly than the social structure is able to adapt to, and if the knowledge, skill and agricultural techniques of the farming population are not adapted to the new land-tenure system, then problems of disorganisation and waste of resources may result.

The Tiree Committee was aware that unofficial representation for development purposes was needed on the island, and at its meeting in April 1968 the Crofters Commissioner for the area reported that he had attended a meeting of the Tiree District Council where a unanimous decision to set up a Council of Social Service had been taken. Following this decision various open general meetings were held on the island, resulting in the

[44]See Further Education Lecture by Bruce, *op. cit.*

formation of a steering committee of twenty people for a Tiree Council of Social Service. From this number, various sub-committees were set up in June 1968 dealing with respectively, agriculture, tourism and industry, and social welfare. The Council of Social Service has now formalised its pattern to some extent and provides a very useful additional medium through which the Crofters Commission can work on the island, as well of course as having other functions which are not the concern of the present paper. In many other parts of the Highlands the Commission has very close ties with local Councils of Social Service and values them as most useful organisations which have a needed role to play in the improvement of the crofting areas.

School and Community

Another field, also outside its official remit, in which the Commission has taken an interesting initiative is education. With the aid of a grant from a charitable foundation the Commission was able, in early 1969, to respond to the several requests it had received from schools in the crofting areas for information and assistance about projects related to the local community. The result has been "Highland Village 1970" a most imaginative scheme whereby schools are able to compete for assistance from the Commission by making a project proposal for some local development. In one case an old village hall is being restored and its surrounding landscape cleaned up and planted with shrubs; in another a folk museum is being established; and in a third an old Norse water-mill is being restored to working order.

Summary

After decades of apathy, even neglect, there is now hope that many crofting areas can maintain reasonably vigorous populations. Undoubtedly the programme of agricultural extension and grants for agricultural purposes can take considerable credit for this. Farming practices on crofts have improved dramatically in recent years. But this alone is not enough. Crofters are not simply small farmers, though the public in general has failed to grasp this.[45] The improvement in crofting agriculture is at least in part due to the greater circulation of money and increased opportunities for wage employment amongst crofters brought about by the growth of tourism and other commercial and industrial activities, often fostered by the Highlands and Islands Board. The crofter thus has some capital to put into his croft or his house. Even more fundamentally, it is the income derived from his non-agricultural pursuits which enables him to remain on his croft. The problem of development, and even survival, is thus by no means only an agricultural one, as the Commission has long been aware. The relationship between crofting and other economic opportunities is mutually complementary and suggests that the social philosophy of the Commission is more than a pious hope.

"We believe that this willingness of crofters to work in industry combined with a desire to own their homes and cultivate or stock a piece of land which they regard as their own, gives us an opportunity in the Highlands of working

[45]As long ago as 1883 the Reverend D. McKinnon of Skye pointed out that "the public and crofters have an erroneous idea about their position . . . (they) were not expected to be self-supporting farmers". Quoted in Crofters Commission (1967) *op. cit.* para. 17.

towards a new form of industrial society which will be healthier and more stable than any community which is completely urbanised. This is the true value of the small croft and as new opportunities of employment are provided, it will increase rather than diminish."[46]

[46]Crofters Commission (1967) *op. cit.* para. 20.

Provincial Development Committees in Zambia*

By R. G. RAINFORD

Mr. Rainford was a resident tutor for the Northern and Luapula Provinces, in the Extra Mural Studies Department, of the University of Zambia, 1967–70.

PROVINCIAL Development Committees in Zambia were formally instituted at the beginning of the Transitional Development Plan, 1965, and were conceived as part of the implementation machinery for executing that Plan, and the succeeding First National Development Plan, 1966–70. Dr. William Tordoff has given consideration to the relationship of P.D.Cs to the overall Political and Administrative structure of the country, and readers are referred to his writings on the subject for a more general contextural approach.[1] This paper concentrates on the internal dynamics of Provincial Development Committees, though some of the implications for the surrounding socio-political system are not entirely ignored.

The First National Development Plan contains an indication of what the formal functions of the Provincial Development Committees would be, namely, "to consider reports from the Provincial Officers of Ministries represented in the Province on progress and difficulties being encountered in executing projects", and to aid in the process of overcoming "bottlenecks in the execution of approved programmes of development . . ."[2] In connection with this latter aspect of its function, each Provincial Development Committee is allocated a lump sum of money, variously called the Block Vote or the Bottleneck Vote, to be used in accordance with certain procedures.

The formal purpose of the P.D.C. therefore, is mainly to exercise an overseeing function over the execution of "approved" plan projects in areas that come under its jurisdiction, namely areas comprising the particular Province. Nominally, its executive and policy-making powers are quite severely restricted, for in the first place the major policy decisions with respect to projects with which the P.D.C. is concerned are taken centrally, at Ministry Headquarters or O.N.D.P.[3] level; and in the second place, the formal rules governing the use of the "Bottleneck Vote" do not leave the P.D.C. any discretion to make final determinations on what constitute bottlenecks.

*Thanks are due to Dr. Cherry Gertzel for affording the writer the opportunity of presenting this paper to the Political Science Seminar at the University of Zambia, and to Dr. William Tordoff for his helpful reading and criticism of the text.

[1]See three articles by Dr. W. Tordoff in the *Journal of Administration Overseas*: Provincial & District Government in Zambia, Part 1; Vol. III, No. 3, July 1968, pp. 425–33; Provincial & District Government in Zambia, Part 2; Vol. VII, No. 4, Oct. 1968, pp. 538–45; Pronvicial & District Government in Zambia, Vol. IX, No. 1, Jan. 1970, pp. 23–35.

[2]*First National Development Plan*, 1966–70 (F.N.D.P.) page 18, paragraph 11.

[3]Office of National Development and Planning, the chief planning agency in Zambia.

Notwithstanding the limited extent of the formal powers of the Provincial Development Committee, nevertheless there are factors that can operate, and in various circumstances do operate, to enlarge the area of effective power exercised by this body, and to enable it to assume additional functions not formally specified or intended.

One important influence in this context is the kind of statements that highly placed members of the Government tend to make in some of their speeches about the role of the P.D.C. Their comments tend frequently to give the impression that they regard the P.D.C. as having more executive and policy-making powers than is formally vested in it. Hence they sometimes suggest tasks for the Provincial Development Committee which, strictly speaking, fall outside the range of its formal functions.[4] The Provincial Development Committee is usually urged by visiting members of the Government in very strong terms to go forth and promote development in all its forms, and this does indeed tend to give its members the feeling that this body can and should do things which in fact it may have no formal power to undertake.[5]

The way in which the business of the Provincial Development Committee is conducted, the personality of the chairman and other members, and the manner in which the top officials on the Committee conceive of its functions are further factors which can and do influence what the Provincial Development Committee does outside the framework of its formal powers.

We are mainly interested in this paper in looking at some of the "unintended" functions that the Provincial Development Committee performs, consciously or unconsciously, and assessing their significance. We shall also be interested in examining the factors that bear on the effectiveness of the Provincial Development Committee in carrying out both its formal and unintended functions. Although a number of general remarks will be made with respect to Provincial Development Committees in the country as a whole[6] nevertheless most of this paper is based on direct observations of the writer at meetings of the Northern Province Development Committee.

The composition of the Provincial Development Committee is designed to reflect all aspects of authority, and some of the various bodies of opinion in the Province, either on a permanent basis or from time to time as and when required. The following categories of persons are full members of the Committee:

> The Provincial Cabinet Minister is ex-officio chairman of the Committee and the Principal Officer (Development) acts as Secretary, and

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[4]The distinction between "manifest" and "latent" functions may be generally relevant here. See R. K. Merton, *Social Theory and Social Structure*, The Free Press, New York, 1957. Page 51, and 61–66.

[5]E.g. at the Northern Province Development Committee meeting held 14th April, 1970, the Minister of State for Education who was present urged that the Committee should concentrate on initiating a wide range of productive projects that would raise rural income. But formally, the P.D.C. has no power to initiate projects in any direct manner; its official function is to perform an overseeing function over projects already approved.

[6]Based on interviews with persons who have had wide experience of P.D.C.s in a number of Provinces.

(a) all Heads of Government Departments represented in the Province,
(b) all District Secretaries in the Province,
(c) all Rural and Town Council Chairmen in the Province,
(d) all District Governors in the Province,[7]
(e) all Regional Secretaries in the Province,
(f) all Rural and Town Council Secretaries in the Province,
(g) M.P's of the Province who do not already come under one of the above categories,
(h) a number of traditional rulers (chiefs fairly high-up in the hierarchy of traditional authority),
(i) various officials from the office of the Cabinet Minister[8] including the Minister of State, the Permanent Secretary, and the Principal Officer (Development).

In addition to these full members there are some persons, who either in their own right or because of the institutions they represent (e.g. statutory corporations) are regularly invited to Provincial Development Committee meetings apparently on the basis of some kind of associate membership. Yet there are others, sometimes private individuals such as businessmen, farmers, etc, who either request to be allowed, or are invited, to attend particular meetings, at which matters of special relevance to them are expected to be raised.

It can be seen that this wide range of membership and associate membership of the P.D.C. implies a normally large number of persons, usually around one hundred, present at its meetings though there are of course cases where the number is somewhat smaller. This large body of persons regularly meeting together has been popularly referred to as a Provincial Parliament, but it is really nothing of the sort in view of the absence of any meaningful legislative power in the Committee, the long interval between meetings (on the average once every three months) and the relatively short duration of meetings (usually from one to three days).[9]

The composition of the P.D.C. indicates immediately some of the various kinds of unintended consequences which could possibly arise, and empirical observation has indeed tended to confirm that some of these consequences have arisen.

One such consequence is in respect of the possible integration of political and administrative functions, at the provincial and district levels. An official body of this nature composed of significant numbers of politicians and civil

[7]These joined the P.D.C. after District Governorships were created in January 1969.

[8]The presence of two Ministers on the Committee (the Cabinet Minister and Minister of State, for the Province) dates back to the administrative reforms of January 1969. Prior to that date the top official in the Province was the Resident Minister, later referred to as Minister of State for the Province, who was ex-officio Chairman of the P.D.C.

[9]Conversation with a number of members of the Northern Province Development Committee, many of whom have had experience on other P.D.C.s, reveal a strong bias in favour of shorter meetings. The Hon. Elijah Mudenda, Minister of Finance and Development, while attending the Northern Province Development Committee meeting of 14th April, 1970 referred with approval to other P.D.C.s which have been holding shorter meetings than the Northern Province Committee.

servants points to the probability of any of three possible alternatives arising. There may be, in the first place, a development of genuine understanding on the part of each category of members as to the basic methods, approach, concerns, and aims of the other, while each side retains its own distinctive and independent outlook. Secondly, if in the general socio-political system there are checks and balances which present us with executive and administrative organs that are firmly protected and relatively powerful, one would probably see the political elements on the Committee feeling constrained to defer to the civil service point of view.

The third alternative is that if such a body as the P.D.C. operates in a setting characterized by unchallenged dominance by a major political organization on the one hand, and on the other an administrative system still in the early stages of development, the representatives of such political organization would tend to convert the committee into an instrument for the promotion of its policy. It is this third alternative which has materialized on at least those Provincial Development Committees in Zambia which are in areas dominated by the major and ruling party, UNIP.[10] It is the political elements on the Committee who traditionally are on the offensive in debates and discussions, and serve as an ever present reminder to the non-political elements that the party is the final source of most favours, and that the party has the power in the final analysis to enforce accountability to itself.

In view of the general national – and apparently accepted – trend towards integration and fusion of party and Government organs, this "unintended" consequence, which is not among the formal purposes of the Provincial Development Committee can be regarded as functional in its effect. It falls within a general pattern that is developing and operates the same direction as the dominant move, firstly to consolidate a one-party system, [11] and further to get the party embedded in the Governmental machinery. An important contribution to this development is made in the context of the Provincial Development Committee, where the political members serve to reinforce the process of recruitment of at least those Government officials who are nationals as agents of the party, if not as party activists, and to impress upon them the current party outlook.

The political elements on the Provincial Development Committee are well placed to achieve this kind of result. The Chairman of the Committee, the Resident Minister and later Minister of State for the Province prior to the administrative reforms in January 1969, and after that the Cabinet Minister for the Province, has always been the highest political representative of the ruling party in the Province, though he is at the same time the most senior representative of the Government. It appears that the civil servant members of the committee tend to regard him as the personification of the party on the Provincial Development Committee, rather than as a chairman in the usual sense of the term; while the other political members see him as their

[10]The writer has not been able to observe whether this can be said to be true of P.D.C.s in Southern and Western Provinces, which contain strong pockets of A.N.C. support, and formerly, in the Western Province, of United Party support.

[11]It can perhaps be argued that this is an aspect or expression of the "monism" which Friedland describes in his analysis of African Socialism. See his "*Four Sociological Trends in African Socialism*" in African Report, Vol. 8, No. 5, May, 1963.

provincial leader actually, if not formally, and as the senior Government representative in so far as they regard the Government and the party as synonymous.

Before the January 1969 reforms, other significant political members were the political assistants, and in the Copperbelt Province the Presidential Relations Assistants. These posts no longer exist, but the political membership has nevertheless increased since the reforms with the creation of District Governorships. District Governors, along with the Minister of State, the Regional Secretaries, and the Chairmen of rural and town councils comprise a formidable political army on the Provincial Development Committee.

A further implication therefore is that the Provincial Development Committee becomes a forum for the articulation and aggregation of political interests at the provincial level.[12] The existence of the one-party system in some areas of the country does not necessarily imply complete uniformity of political thinking in these areas. Within the framework of the one party system, significant differences in outlook and orientation to various issues occasionally arise; and though the politicians on the Provincial Development Committee as a group usually present a united front to the civil servants, nevertheless sometimes interesting debates arise within the political group on various policy issues.

The political element on the Provincial Development Committee also serves to transform it into an important channel of communication in the political system. District Governors, Regional Secretaries, and Rural Council Chairmen, who are in close touch with feelings at the grassroots, to some extent bring various aspects of popular sentiment to the Provincial Development Committee, which filters and passes them on to other levels in the political and governmental system. Before the administrative reforms of January 1969, the Provincial Development Committee channelled this kind of communication primarily to O.N.D.P., but now in addition it is also channelled to the Cabinet, now that Government administration at the provincial level is headed by a Cabinet Minister who is also ex-officio Chairman of the Provincial Development Committee.

It appears therefore that the P.D.C. is part of one of at least two basic lines of communication in the political system from the district and provincial levels up to the top of the political and administrative pyramid, and both lines seem to form a closed circuit. One line runs from the constituency office through to the levels of Regional Secretary and District Governor, on to the National Council and through to the Central Committee, (when it is

[12]See the discussion of these concepts in Almond and Coleman, *Politics of Developing Areas*, Princeton University Press, 1960, page 33-45. It must be noted that the P.D.C. is not the only, and not the most important instrument for promoting the articulation and aggregation of political interests. The Provincial Political Committee, which meets from time to time, and in many cases immediately after the P.D.C. meeting, is probably more significant in this respect. The Political Committee provides another interesting example of fusion of Party and Government organs, in view of the fact that its Secretary is ex-officio the Administrative Officer (General Duties), a civil servant.

in operation)[13] which is presided over by the President, and of which many senior ministers of the Government are members. The other also runs through the levels of Regional Secretary and District Governor through the P.D.C. and Cabinet Minister for the Province and on to the Cabinet and to O.N.D.P. It is not within the scope of this paper to examine how well these channels of communication actually work, but only to identify a structure which provides for such communication.

As far as the channelling of communication to the O.N.D.P. is concerned, the P.D.C. performs the function of co-ordinating political impact from the local level on the process of planning and plan implementation. Although the P.D.C. has no power to formulate the provincial part of the National Development Plan, nevertheless it acts during the planning stage as an instrument for co-ordinating proposals at the provincial level and passing on these co-ordinated proposals to O.N.D.P. Most of these proposals come from Heads of Government Departments in the province, and a part of these proposals that emanate from them are made as a result of their own independent appraisal and conclusions. But other proposals that come from these Heads of Departments reflect the actual popular demands of people in various localities, frequently made through political channels.

With regards the channelling of communication to the Cabinet, here the P.D.C., especially since the reforms of January 1969, becomes an integral part of the process that keeps both the grass roots and the upper reaches of the political system in tune with each other. Before the reforms, formal upward communication from the P.D.C. to the top had to filter through the O.N.D.P., (and perhaps informally through the National Council). But now, with a Cabinet minister chairing the Committee, this roundabout route becomes less important, and it is possible for the Cabinet to be receiving first hand account of sentiments at the most local level a day or two after a P.D.C. meeting has been held. Indeed the converse is also true, as the chairman of the P.D.C. may sometimes come to a P.D.C. meeting almost directly from the cabinet.

In connection with the P.D.C's role as a channel of communication, it can readily be seen that it is developing as a forum for the airing of a very wide range of complaints. It sometimes really appears to be a clearing house for grievances. It is reasonable to regard this as an important stage in *enforcing awareness* of a wide range of problems on which, at other levels, e.g. O.N.D.P. and Ministry of Development and Finance, policy decisions have to be made and executive action taken.

A further important unintended consequence to which the composition of the P.D.C. points, relates to the question of the legitimacy of the modern government in the eyes of the authorities. We have stated that a number of chiefs who occupy fairly senior positions in the hierachy of traditional

[13]The Central Committee, which is the supreme policy making organ of the Party (U.N.I.P.), was suspended by President Kaunda in August 1969 under emergency powers he assumed in order to deal with an impending crisis within the party, of which many people had some awareness, but which apparently has never been clearly defined. The National Council is a periodic gathering of party delegates from all over the country, and is usually the occasion for announcements of major development in Government policy.

political authority comprise one category of members of the P.D.C. Notwithstanding the generally held view that the problem of legitimacy of new systems of authority and Government is not as great in Zambia[14] as in other modernizing politics, nevertheless the presence of formally important chiefs on the P.D.C. has the effect of putting a further stamp of approval on the modern government in the eyes of those who may still be tradition-bound.[15]

We have been examining some of the probably unintended consequences of the P.D.C. which seem to be directly related to the nature of its composition. We shall now take the opportunity of looking at other consequences which derive from other features of this body.

It has already been noted that the P.D.C. contains a fairly large body of political officials in the Province. The nature of the Committee's work serves to make it into a training ground for these politicians, especially those who are in junior and middle positions, such as Rural Council Chairmen, Regional Secretaries, and District Governors. The P.D.C. provides them with an opportunity, additional to others available to them, to gain experience in a wider setting than that of their own immediate areas, and to display their talents and win their spurs outside these areas. If the Almond and Coleman variables for analysing a political system[16] can be regarded as being at all relevant, then this would seem to be a part of what they would call the political recruitment process.

Observing the performance of various politicians on the Committee, one gets the impression that they are very much aware of the potential value of the P.D.C. in promoting their political careers; and sometimes there seems to be an undeclared competition between some politicians, probably to see who raised the most points or queries, or occupied the floor most frequently, during P.D.C. meetings. Although this may not be very helpful as far as the immediate formal purposes of the P.D.C. are concerned, nevertheless it is quite valuable and functional for the defining and emergence of political personalities at the Provincial level, and in providing a reservoir of well-known politicians who can move up the hierarchy as and when the need arises.

It is also interesting to consider certain aspects of accountability of civil servants in the context of the P.D.C. Plan projects, which it is the responsibility of Provincial Heads of Department to implement, have to be reported on, directly or indirectly, by these Heads of Department to the P.D.C. At the same time the Provincial Heads of Department are responsible to their Lusaka headquarters for the implementation of these projects. Since the P.D.C. is not directly accountable onwards to the same Lusaka Headquarters, but rather to O.N.D.P. and the National Development Committee, which is "concerned primarily with the control of the execution of the

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[14]See, for instance, address to the Seminar of U.N.I.P. officials by Professor Lameck Goma, Vice-Chancellor of the University of Zambia, on 30th June, 1970.

[15]It must not be thought however that the P.D.C. is the only, or the most important, organ that is instrumental in producing this effect. The House of Chiefs, for example, notwithstanding its lack of executive and policy-making power, is probably much more significant in this respect.

[16]Almond and Coleman, *op. cit.*, pages 31-32.

Development Plan",[17] it appears at first sight that Provincial Heads are presented with two conflicting lines of accountability. Whether there is actually conflict or not depends on how the system works in each particular case, and how much power the P.D.C. tries to wield. For on closer examination it appears there need not necessarily be any conflict, when we take account of the fact that the formal position is that the policy and implementation aspects of plan projects are directed from Lusaka while the P.D.C. is intended only to receive reports on the progress of implementation, and to ensure that implementation is as decided centrally in Lusaka. Seen in this light the two lines of accountability do not necessarily conflict with, but rather complement, each other. But the system does not always function in the way it is formally intended to work. A conflict of accountability sometimes occurs when the P.D.C. tries to exercise additional authority, or when an official misinterprets the role of the Committee.[18]

The question of accountability to the P.D.C. raises certain interesting questions of democracy and responsible government in the context of the provincial administration. In classical thinking and practice, responsibility and accountability of the civil service as a whole is to Parliament through the various ministers concerned. This is the principle of ministerial responsibility. In cases where politicians in the Province can be regarded as genuine leaders thrown up by the people, their presence on the P.D.C. where they constantly quiz civil servants on the progress of implementation of plan projects, appears to be a healthy development from the democratic point of view. It seems that the hidden principle at work here is that the executive and administrative power of senior district and provincial civil servants should not be without responsibility at the district and provincial levels. Civil service accountability at this level is not expressed *only* through the medium of ministerial responsibility, but also through some principle of "*individual responsibility*" of senior district and provincial civil servants. The perennial tension between the political and civil service elements on the P.D.C. thus has an opportunity, in this respect, of being played out constructively, rather than destructively.

A further important unintended consequence, or latent function, of the P.D.C. is with regards to its educational effect. Many members of the P.D.C., among both the politicians and the civil servants, have only a somewhat rudimentary knowledge of the principles of Government, generally and in the special context of Zambia, of administrative procedures, and the policies behind various aspects of government action. There is also sometimes a failure to understand how departments in the province relate, or do not relate, to one another.

A useful by-product of the discussion of progress reports and the transaction of other business at P.D.C. meetings is that members develop and broaden their knowledge and understanding of these matters, with the probable result that they become more effective in discharging their official roles. This learning process is carried on in two main ways. Firstly the

[17] *First National Development Plan*, 1966-70, page 17, para. 3.

[18] The Minister, Permanent Secretary and Development Officer are on the staff of the Provincial and Local Government Division of the V.P.'s Office. The P.D.C. has therefore some accountability to that division as well as O.N.D.P., thus placing a premium on co-operation between them.

members pick up information from one another, each probably contributing as much as he receives. Secondly important visitors attending from O.N.D.P. and from Lusaka-based Ministries,[19] and senior and more experienced members of the P.D.C. such as the Permanent Secretary, the Cabinet Minister, and the Principal Officer (Development), all pass on vital information on the principles of governmental action, and developments with respect to various aspects of government policy.

The result is that the average official in the Province gets to understand more about the procedural methods of various government departments, at least at provincial level. His knowledge of the machinery of government is considerably improved. He develops a balanced awareness and sense of perspective of his own place in the overall administrative system, and he is kept abreast of aspects of government policy on a wide range of matters which may not be the immediate concern of his department. Above all, he is kept in touch with developments in other departments at the provincial level, and this enables him to relate his work more meaningfully with what is going on in his area.

This educational function of the P.D.C. must be regarded as being particularly valuable, especially in view of the fact that it does not appear to overlap with any other institution or organ at the provincial level that has a comparable effect. It is a useful part of the informal adult education process in the community. The writer has been able to observe cases where the development of an official's awareness and knowleged of various aspects of government was directly attributable to the educational effect of the P.D.C.

It has been the purpose of this paper mainly to look at some of the unintended or informal consequences of the P.D.C., and not primarily to examine the success or failure with which it has achieved its formal purposes, whatever the proper definition of these may be. This should properly be the subject of another paper. Nevertheless, as a link between this kind of concern and the main preoccupation of this paper, it will be of interest to consider in outline the way the P.D.C. carries out its work, and the extent of its probable impact on development.

The formal purpose of the P.D.C. has already been briefly described in the first part of this paper. In a nutshell, it is to perform an overseeing function over the implementation of plan projects formulated elsewhere (O.N.D.P.), and, in the early stages of planning, to channel local demands and ideas upward to the central planning agency. In addition the P.D.C. is granted a lump sum of money, the Bottleneck Vote or Block Vote, the amount of which is determined each year, to be spent on clearing up bottlenecks to projects, where such bottlenecks would not normally come under the responsibility or any particular department or ministry.

[19]Two good examples of this may be cited: the Plan Liaison Officer from O.N.D.P. at the Northern Province Development Committee Meeting of 15th-16th October, 1968, gave information on a wide range of technical problems, including an explanation of the economic factors behind the Government's freezing of expenditure on a number of projects. (This was observed by the writer and does not appear to have been included in the Minutes of the meeting). The Minister of State for Education at the Northern Province Development Committee meeting of 14th April, 1970, gave information on the latest development in Government's policy with respect to self-help schools, information which many, apparently including the acting Chief Education Officer for the Province, did not know before.

It can be readily seen therefore that formally the P.D.C. has very little or no policy making and executive power at all. It acts as a watch dog over those charged with the responsibility of implementing plan projects, and does not itself formulate plan projects which it can instruct officials to implement. Whatever little policy-making functions it exercises if of necessity in connection with its use of the Bottleneck Fund. But normally, the general rule is that certain strict conditions must be satisfied before the P.D.C. can undertake any expenditure from this Fund; namely, that there must be an unforeseen bottleneck which blocks the implementation of an approved project, that no funds are otherwise available from any ministry or department to remove the bottleneck, and that O.N.D.P. indicates its recognition of the problem as a bottleneck. Strictly speaking therefore, it means that the final word in the policy-making function of deciding what is a bottleneck rests with the O.N.D.P. and not with the P.D.C.

One direction in which the P.D.C. has the possibility of increasing its power therefore is by increasing its say in the definition of bottlenecks. If the P.D.C. can find ways and means of avoiding the restrictive conditions attached to the use of the Bottleneck Fund, this increase in its power could be applied, though not necessarily, to achieve greater impact on development.* The general trend appears to be that P.D.C's tend to struggle, consciously or unconsciously, against the restricting conditions that apply to the use of the Bottleneck Fund. For the P.D.C. usually has ideas for projects, not in the Plan, and which are not intended to remove any bottlenecks, which it considers, rightly or wrongly, would promote meaningful development. To undertake such projects with money from the Bottleneck Fund requires that the P.D.C. must either be released formally from the restricting conditions referred to, or it must indulge in some amount of irregular practice and release itself informally from these restrictions.

The fact is that P.D.C's have been able to follow the latter course on various occasions without any serious repercussions, and the absence of serious repercussions can be taken as a mark of the growth of the informal powers of the P.D.C., in which the O.N.D.P. appears to acquiesce. We are thus faced with the prospect of the formal position remaining unchanged, while *de facto* practice develops differently and becomes hardened by custom.

As a result of this informal release from the restrictions on the Bottleneck Fund which some P.D.C's have achieved, the possibility arises that although the particular P.D.C. may think its use of this fund is promoting development, this nevertheless may not be the case from the objective point of view; or at least the contribution to development may not be as great as it would have been if these resources were used differently. This highlights one advantage of the restrictions on the use of the fund, namely, that presumably when O.N.D.P. makes final determinations on what are bottlenecks, it uses proper tools of economic analysis in examining the proposals received, and thereby prevents resources being used on projects whose contribution to development is questionable or negligible. On the other hand however, it is possible for the P.D.C., with a free hand, to use the Bottleneck Fund to promote meaning-

*It is understood that some of the restrictions on the use of block votes have now been removed—Ed.

ful development to a greater extent, depending on its choice of activities, than if it were constrained to obeying the restrictions all the time. A further consideration is that if the P.D.C. handles the fund with more freedom, then even if it restricts itself to using it for solving genuine bottlenecks to approved Plan projects, this would be an immediate advantage in that it cuts out the delay involved in waiting for a decision from Lusaka.

P.D.C's which assume the power of using Bottleneck Funds for various purposes without first referring their proposals to O.N.D.P., continue to pay lip service to the notion of "bottleneck" in describing these purposes. Of course some of these expenditures are on things that do not remotely resemble bottlenecks to any approved plan project, and this is usually pointed out by the appropriate authorities, though, as we have stated, without any serious repercussions. This tendency could mushroom around the country as chairmen and other senior officials who manage P.D.C. affairs, such as the Provincial Permanent Secretary and the Principal Officer (Development) who have indulged in such practices successfully, move on transfers around the provinces. Funds from the Bottleneck Vote have been used for some very imaginative purposes at times; e.g. the Northern Province Development Committee once decided to use up funds from this vote to beautify some of the water falls in the Province in order to avoid giving up money in the vote which would have remained unspent at the end of the particular financial year.[20]

On the other hand, with this informal, if irregular, approach to the use of the Bottleneck Fund, P.D.C's have managed to promote useful development projects that few ministries would have got around to planning for, and if they did would achieve implementation only after long and frustrating delays. These projects are sometimes of the modest kind that make a real difference to the life of people in villages and small rural communities. For example at the same P.D.C. meeting where funds from the Bottleneck Vote were allocated for beautifying water falls in Northern Province, other sums were also allocated for setting up a scheme for ox-drawn ploughing, the improvement of feeder roads and bridges, the improvement of water supplies in a number of specified villages, extension to Chinsali hospital, the building of new primary class room blocks, and the setting up of health centres in some remote areas.[21]

More recently, the Northern P.D.C. approved loans to the Mufubushi settlement scheme, and granted a loan to a promising garage run on a co-operative basis,[22] and later still we see the committee making allocations for the completion of school buildings in Mbala district, the improvement of roads and water supplies.[23]

Many of these items would not quailify as bottlenecks to approved plan projects and many of them could very well be eventually included in the

[20] Minutes of Northern Province Development Committee Meeting held 15th-16th October, 1968.
[21] *Ibid.*
[22] Minutes of Northern Province Development Committee Meeting held 29th April, 1969.
[23] Minutes of Northern Province Development Committee Meeting held 14th-15th April, 1970.

programmes of various ministries and departments. In a number of cases the requests came from the provincial officers of particular ministries, who discerned problems that called for early action, and who resorted to the Bottleneck Vote in order to avoid the time-consuming process of soliciting funds from their Ministry Headquarters. Of course, once the P.D.C. approves such requests and allocates the funds asked for, there is the important question of follow-up. Sometimes there are situations where a case was not properly examined, and no proper system for checking and follow-up was adopted, with the result that resources remained unused or were misused.[24]

This question of follow-up on allocations made by the P.D.C. in the above manner can conveniently be regarded as part of the overseeing function which is included among the formal purposes of the Committee. The contribution of the P.D.C. to development is also related to the effectiveness with which it performs this "watchdog" function. It can be said that the degree of effectiveness achieved in this regard is determined by two main factors which, admittedly, overlap to some extent. These factors are, firstly, the manner in which the Committee organises the work it does, and in the second place, the personality, ability, and drive of the Chairman.[25]

The P.D.C.s were originally established with the purpose of *inter alia*, receiving "reports from the Provincial Officers of Ministries represented in the province on progress and difficulties being encountered in executing projects". Some of the approved projects for the province in the Plan, it is feasible to imagine, may fail to get implemented, either in whole or in part, or possibly on time. Such failures could be due to a number of different kinds of factors, some of which would be of the kind that cannot be helped, e.g. failure of materials, equipment and machinery to arrive at a site, perhaps because vital road links were destroyed during the rains. Other factors however may be due to absence of a sense of urgency and lack of acumen and drive on the part of the officials concerned. In this kind of situation all the concrete elements that make for development – materials, capital, skill – may be available but human factors such as the organizational and administrative elements may be missing. It is in this context that the P.D.C. can make a meaningful contribution to development by effective performance of its overseeing, or "watch-dog" function.

There seems to be ample evidence to conclude that many, if not all, provincial officials are spurred to exert greater efforts by the knowledge that at each P.D.C. meeting some kind of progress report on projects for which they are responsible will have to be submitted. It appears that even those who

[24]A loan of K14,000 of which K9,000 was actually issued, was made to a co-operatively run garage in 1967, by the Northern Province Development Committee, to be paid back from a loan expected to be made by the Industrial Development Corporation of Zambia (INDECO). It appears that this garage never got his latter loan up to early 1969, and that it was having serious financial difficulties. An investigation revealed that no accounts were kept! Minutes of the Northern Province Development Committee Meeting, held 29th April, 1969.

[25]This point is based on the writer's observation over a period of time of the conduct of business on the Northern Province Development Committee, and of the influence of four Chairman of that Committee. It is also based on interviews with officials who have had experience of other P.D.C.s and their Chairmen; (including one person who had served under eight Chairmen.)

may be inclined to regard themselves as being accountable to their Headquarters in Lusaka, and not to the P.D.C., will take care to see that they are not to blame personally for obstacles to the implementation of their projects. They try as much as possible to have firm ground on which to stand, in terms of the progress of their projects, to face the sometimes hostile quizzing from the political elements on the Committee to say nothing of the Chairman's sharp questions. One has only to be present at P.D.C. meetings to appreciate that there is nothing more embarrassing to the provincial official and damaging to his ego than to be in a situation where he has presented an obviously unsatisfactory report, and is unable to give a convincing reply in the face of demands by the Chairman and other politicians for an explanation. What appears to be at work here is the principle of individual responsibility of provincial Heads of Department referred to earlier in this article and the constructive playing out of tension between the political and civil service members of the Committee.

Apparently the general method that most P.D.C.s have used to transact business consisted of having each Head of Department in the Province personally submit a written report at each meeting, giving a comprehensive set of facts and figures on projects that he is responsible for implementing. Members then make comments and raise questions on various points in the report. Sometimes the reporting official may be subjected to a gruelling cross examination, and at other times he may get off lightly. Resolutions may be passed and directives handed down, especially by a strong Chairman whose ability and authority are respected, about future action to be taken on points in the report.

In some cases, members and senior officials responsible for managing the P.D.C. have become impatient with the method whereby reports are submitted personally by Heads of Departments. This means that the Committee has to consider a long series of reports, many of which overlap with each other, since each department in the province does not work in a vacuum, but impinges on others. Early in 1969, on the initiative of the Chairman in office at the time, the Northern Province Development Committee ended this procedure, and adopted instead a system of sub-committees all of which were given areas of responsibility to report on, which together would cover all that the former system dealt with, but in a more concise and expeditious manner. The Sub-Committee established were as follows:

Productivity—to consider problems related to increased output, especially in Agriculture

Execution and Construction—to look into the state of physical implementation of projects, especially building projects

Planning—to consider choice of sites, bids from the Bottleneck Vote, and other relevant matters.[26]

This development was in line with a wish expressed by the Chairman at an earlier date that P.D.C. meetings should run for a maximum of four hours, rather than the two days taken in the past to complete the business of

[26]Minutes of Northern Province Development Committee Meeting held 29th April, 1969.

the Committee.[27] At a later stage, though these Sub-Committees were still retained, the reporting job was also given over to District Governors, who submit progress reports for their districts. This seems to be an important part of the training for these politicians. Notwithstanding these changes in the reporting task, the provincial officials responsible for implementing projects are still regarded as the persons who must give explanations for any aspect of the Plan implementation programme with which the Committee is dissatisfied.

Mention has been made of the personality and drive of the P.D.C. Chairman as a factor in the effectiveness with which the Committee performs its overseeing function. The case of the reorganisation of its methods of transacting business undertaken by the Northern Province Development Committee, is an outstanding example of the impact that a Chairman can have.

A skilful and able Chairman often maximises the effectiveness and power of the P.D.C. in several other ways: by the manner in which he guides the Committee to indulge in non-regular uses of the Bottleneck Vote; the manner in which he handles and resolves disputes arising on the floor; the way in which he leads the Committee to pass relevant resolutions on points in the various reports, and arranges for follow-up; by the way he uses authority vested in him in his capacity as the personal representative of the President, to issue directives and instructions *that will be obeyed*; the manner in which he conducts his own incisive questioning of officials, cutting through a mass of irrelevances and getting to the vital points at issue; and by the way in which he controls such things as the extended discussions that tend to develop around numerous "points of order" and "points of information".

Failure of the Chairman to act effectively on any of these fronts reduces the potential effectiveness and power of the P.D.C., and it appears that P.D.C.s have their maximum impact on development when led by Chairmen who show all round competence in dealing with these points.[28]

[27]Minutes of Northern Province Development Committee Meeting held 3rd February, 1969.
[28]See Footnote 25.

Easing the Stays:
Fijian administration during the past decade

By PETER FRANCE

Dr. France was lately Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Fijian Affairs, Suva.

IN the decade preceding independence there were sweeping changes in the Fijian Administration in the direction of a relaxation of the paternalism of previous policy. That policy had survived the challenges of the previous seventy-five years. It is instructive to examine the reasons for its survival and the conditions which led to its moderation.

The examination of government policy is normally a hazardous process, since that which we so name is often no more than the accidental resemblance, viewed in retrospect, of *ad hoc* decisions taken for reasons of expediency. The Fijian Administration has, however, had its eloquent spokesmen and, not least because of the challenges which it has had to face down the years, these men have formulated clear statements of the policy and its justifications. Most easily available outside Fiji are the publications of a former head of the Fijian Administration, Mr. G. K. Roth, and I propose to trace briefly the changes which have recently been made to the policy as set out in his published statements.[1]

The Fijian Administration was originally set up by the first Governor of Fiji, Sir Hercules Robinson, in accordance, it is suggested, with the structure by which Fijians governed themselves in pre-contact times. The need to preserve the cultural identity of Fijians, particularly in the stresses of a multi-racial situation, led the colonial government to resist modifications of this administrative structure which were felt to be contrary to the spirit in which it was originally established:

> The principles found in indigenous institutions were first given statutory authority at the time of the Cession when a form of local government was set up with jurisdiction over all Fijians in the Colony. Its establishment implemented undertakings given by the British Government that the Fijians would be governed "in accordance with native usages and customs" . . . and the system has for seventy-five years proved to be practical and adaptable to the changing needs of world conditions[2]

It is no part of the present study to examine how accurate was the assumption

[1] See especially G. K. Roth, *Native Administration in Fiji during the past 75 years: a successful experiment in indirect rule*, Occasional Paper No. 10, Royal Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland, London 1951, and G. K. Roth, *Fijian Way of Life*, Oxford University Press, Melbourne, 1953.
[2] *Ibid.*

that the Fijian Administration was based on "indigenous institutions",[3] but merely to trace the changes which have been brought about during the last decade to this system which had been carefully preserved by the colonial government in the belief that its principles had "deep roots in the hearts of the Fijians".[4]

The most disturbing trend in the fifties was the tendency of Fijians to leave their villages and settle in towns. Against this escape from the social system which it had so carefully preserved, the Fijian Administration set its face. It adopted, on the advice of the Council of Chiefs in 1941, three principles of policy for the future:

1. to maintain the closest connexion between the Fijian and the land,
2. to preserve the integrity of village society, and
3. to improve the material conditions of the villages by amalgamations based on kinship and proximity to planting grounds.[5]

The hope was that Fijians, receiving higher education in increasing numbers, would not only seek posts in Government or industry, but also return to their villages and assume positions of social leadership in the widest sense, giving example to others, so that they might together "in the healthy and natural environment of their village . . . contribute extensively to the common prosperity not only of the Fijian population but of the Colony as a whole".[6]

The evolution of Fijian Affairs has taken, it must be recorded, a different direction from that envisaged. Young men with training in academic subjects have not been drawn, by and large, to the "healthy and natural environment of their village." They have sought rather the excitement and material rewards of urban society. At the 1966 census, almost 38 per cent of the Fijian population was found to be living in towns and urban areas.[7]

Fijians move to the towns for a variety of reasons which are currently being investigated by sociologists. Pending the scientific analysis of Fijian motives, however, it might be suggested that they move because they find village life dull. Their daily work is no longer stimulating and is subject to interference from unsympathetic elders. The town's obvious attractions are employment opportunities and social freedom.

The main effort of the administration, in the post-war years was bent on settling back into village life those who had been educated outside it. And the supposition was that this élite would exercise an enlightening influence in the villages, leading to the development of an intellectually emancipated community of rustics who had preserved all that was of value in their simple pre-European days.

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[3] I have done so elsewhere, see Peter France, "The Founding of our Orthodoxy: Sir Arthur Gordon and the Doctrine of the Fijian Way of Life", *The Journal of Polynesian Society*, Vol. 77, No. 1, March 1968, pp. 6-32; and Peter France, *The Charter of the Land*, Oxford University Press, Melbourne, 1969.

[4] G. K. Roth, *Fijian Way of Life* p. 160.

[5] *Ibid*, p. 162.

[6] *Ibid*, p. 163.

[7] *Report on the Census of the Population*, 1966, Legislative Paper No. 9, p. 6, Government Press, Suva, 1968.

That it should ever have been considered possible to retain educated Fijians in rural "traditional" society is, perhaps, more in need of explanation than the failure of such an aim.

It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that this policy was based on assumptions stemming from the idealism of an earlier age. It manifests the trappings of the "noble savage" myth which Europeans first brought to the South Seas. Island natives were presumed to lead an idyllic pastoral existence, with malice towards none; and to the preservation of this state a breed of colonial administrators was dedicated. Fiji was one of many areas where the rude perfection of rustic society might be presumed to have developed. It was necessary, then, to turn the natives from their heathen gods, to cover their bodies and educate their minds without destroying the delicate and beautiful social fabric which the generosity of nature and man's innate goodness had produced.

It seems curious that this view should have been propagated as late as 1953. But the realization of change dawns slowly in the South Pacific. In New Zealand the retention of the indigenes in agricultural pursuits had been proposed as inevitable only 13 years before by a Pakeha expert on Maori society:

> "While a scattered few may enter into a variety of everyday town occupations and live a semi-European life in the towns and cities, one sees no future for the people as a whole save a life based on the land."[8]

Not only were Fijians pressed into agriculture, they were officially frowned on if their farming activities became too much centred about their families. The official assumption was that Fijian aspirations were by nature and by nurture orientated to the community good and that individual economic effort produced cracks in the delicate social fabric which the Fijian Administration was established to protect and conserve:

> "The principle of individualism was, however, given a trial in later years but the criteria on which Fijians were released from the customary social services being contrary to the best interests of those concerned, it was finally abandoned in 1944 when the Governor, Sir Philip Mitchell, having seen for himself its effects in a number of Provinces, decided that it did not work."[9]

By the time the book in which this passage appears was first published there was evident a growing disquiet amongst Fijians at the system of administration which seemed to be – and was – geared to keeping them in their villages. During the mid-50's objections to the agricultural and village-oriented Fijian administration were voiced in the Fijian press by the more radical young educated Fijians as well as through government channels by administrative and agricultural officers whose schemes for "development" were frustrated by the social setting in which they were carried out.

Even in late 1950s it was still officially held that Fijians were essentially community-minded and incapable of, or slow to appreciate, individual effort.

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[8]Sutherland, *The Maori People Today*, quoted in J. N. Harre "The Background to Race Relations in New Zealand", *Race*, V, 1963, p. 10.
[9]G. K. Roth, *Fijian Way of Life*, p. 138.

Development schemes were planned on a community basis; co-operative societies spread rapidly throughout the islands spurred by an assumption that Fijians, having a highly-developed community consciousness, would work at their best in the co-operative movement.[10]

But there was a general feeling that all these schemes were somehow missing the mark. Community Development went off with an initial burst of enthusiasm but interest quickly flagged and without external pressures the momentum was rapidly lost and progress halted. Co-operative societies too, started off well and many kept up the pace, for long periods, under the eye of inspectors from Suva. The fatal occasion was often the commitment of society funds for some communal project under the enthusiasm of the annual general meeting – an occasion provocative of public demonstration of social loyalties. This was often followed by a rash of retributive credit which emptied the store shelves without filling the till.

In 1959 a searching analysis of Fijian society and its adaptability to the needs of a monetary economy was carried out. In a report published both in English and Fijian, Professor O. H. K. Spate of the Australian National University lays bare with unprecedented candour, the shortcomings of the Fijian Administration.[11]

The publication of this report was closely followed by a Commission of Enquiry "into the natural resources and population trends of the colony" headed by Sir Alan Burns. The report of this Commission, published early in 1960, [12] stressed the fact that the dual administration was wasteful and not in the best interest of Fijians. It pointed out that the Fijian Administration tended to isolate Fijians from other communities and recommended that its functions should be radically altered in the direction of direct administration – Rokos and Bulis were to be paid through the District Officer's Office and the Roko were to be "directly and solely responsible to Commissioners". As multi-racial local government was set up in areas of the colony, the report recommended that it should replace the Fijian Administration.

Conscious of Fijian sentiment about preserving racial and cultural identity, the Commission tried to sugar the pill by suggesting that, where the Fijian Administration had been absorbed into a multi-racial local government, Provincial Councils might occupy themselves in the preservation of native craft work and Fijian ceremonial:

> There might perhaps also be a central annual Festival or gathering of Fijians on the lines of the Scottish Braemar Gathering (or Highland Games) and the Welsh Eistedfodd (sic).[13]

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[10]". . . a movement which they understand the more readily because its principles are similar to those of the agricultural social organisation in the midst of which they have been brought up." G. K. Roth, *Native Administration in Fiji* . . . , p. 7.

[11]O. H. K. Spate, *The Fijian People: economic problems and prospects*, Legislative Council Paper No. 13, Government Printer, Suva, 1959.

[12]*Report of the Commission of Enquiry into the Natural Resources and Population Trends of the Colony of Fiji*, Legislative Council Paper No. 1. Government Printer, Suva, 1960.

[13]*Ibid.* page. 177.

It would not be overstating the matter to say that there was general Fijian umbrage at the Burns Commission report as a whole; not least at the suggestion that the Fijian Administration be gradually transformed into a sort of ethnic Arts Council preoccupied with the advancement of local equivalents of folk-weaving and morris dancing and supporting a system of *volkerschaftisch* regional committees.

But the Burns Commission brought squarely before the government of the day the anomalies in the Fijian Administration. As to the Fijians, they made known their opposition to change through their Provincial Councils, the Fijian Affairs Board, and the Council of Chiefs. The government was thus faced with a problem of reducing Fijian attachment to an organisation of its own creation but which was costly, and, in terms of local government, inefficient and radically divisive. At the Council of Chiefs meeting in 1962, the governor spoke as follows:

> "I must tell you frankly that I have been greatly concerned to see that during the last few years there has been a most serious falling off in the payment of provincial rates – so serious as to endanger the very existence of the Fijian Administration in its present form. During the discussion of the Burns Report the Fijian people, through their representative bodies, made it clear that they greatly valued their administration. But the failure of such a large proportion of the population to pay their rates suggests that they have become dissatisfied with its present form and raises serious doubt about its suitability to current conditions. I know that in the Provincial Councils last year some progress was made in modifying the functions of Provincial and Tikina Councils but it appears that more drastic reforms are necessary. Government cannot increase its present subsidy to the Fijian Administration and if the people really value the Administration they must be prepared to pay for it."[14]

The Council responded by abolishing the regulations providing for compulsory labour and by setting up a committee to recommend changes in the Fijian Administration.

This Committee was helped in its deliberations by the changing outlook of educated Fijians who consistently pointed out the stresses and anomalies caused by the attempt concurrently to preserve and develop them. The official version of Fijian society, as accepted by the orthodoxy of the Fijian Administration, had a strongly hierarchical authority structure and an assumed subversion of individual desires and ambitions in the interest of the common weal. One arm of government, it was said, appeared to be devoted to the preservation of this *modus vivendi*, whilst the other was oriented to producing a "developed" culture in Western terms: namely one whose policy was broadly based and whose economy depended on individual competitiveness.

The Committee recommended that the Provincial Councils should be transformed into rural local government authorities by extending their functions and by basing their membership on election from the inhabitants of the province instead of nomination from above. The Roko, who had previously

[14] *Report on the Proceedings of the Council of Chiefs*, Government Printer, Suva, 1962.

been, as his title indicates, in a position of chiefly authority over the province and had nominated its chiefs to the council, was to become the clerk to the council and its paid servant (although the parlous state of provincial finances made it necessary that government should continue to meet his salary). The councils were to be permitted to pass, with the consent of the Secretary for Fijian Affairs, by-laws and to collect and spend rates; and failure to pay the rates was to be made, as in "advanced" countries, a civil and not a criminal offence. This meant, in effect, that defaulters became liable to civil process, which could result in the public auctioning of their worldy goods, rather than to imprisonment.

When the committee's recommendations were brought before the Council of Chiefs in the following year, they were accepted, even though the changes they proposed were sweeping and subversive of chiefly authority (which goes to show that in Fijian councils it is often not so much the nature but the source of advice that determines its acceptability). The Council wisely saw that the proposals would need to be carefully explained to provincial councils and recommended the appointment of a Fijian who had been largely responsible for the analysis of the conflicts within Fijian society and for the formulation of the proposals, to tour the provinces and explain the merits of the new plan.

Dr. Rusiate Nayacakalou succeeded in gaining enthusiastic support for the proposals in all parts of Fiji and also worked out a way of financing them. Although the Burns Commission had opposed the introduction of a land tax, he investigated the feasibility of imposing a rate on Fijian land as a means of spreading the burden of Fijian Administration finance more equitably. His researches showed that, in the test province of Tailevu, it would be cheaper for about 60 per cent of the land-owning units and the province would improve its revenue by about 66 per cent. Not surprisingly, the recommendation for the introduction of a land rating system was accepted by the Fijian Affairs Board and put into operation.

The land rating system is based on the fact that, whereas Fijians move around the colony and are often difficult to keep track of for the extraction of the poll tax, the land remains and can be, if necessary, leased to produce an unpaid rate. The system currently operates in four provinces and may well be extended to all if the difficulties which have arisen in its operation can be overcome.

The whole of the land in the province is first valued by a government valuer and cards are produced showing the acreage owned by each land-owning unit and the total value of its lands. The total value of lands within the province is assessed and the provincial council is then able to strike a rate which will result in the payment of sufficient revenue to meet its needs. Lands of higher value are often leased and the owners can give consent to the Native Land Trust Board to deduct rates payable on these lands from the rents due to them. If the lands are not being used, the owners can request the Board to lease them and to pay over from the ensuing rents the rates due on the lands. Each owning unit nominates a member, usually the head, to be responsible for the payment of the rate.

Difficulties have arisen where lands were leased many years ago at low rentals. Long intervals were often specified in the older long-term leases between revisions of rents so it happens that a piece of land may be returning less in rents per year than the rate which is due on it. In such cases, the valuer is empowered to make a notional valuation until the rent is increased.

A further difficulty is that, although the rates are payable under the Fijian Affairs Ordinance by the owners, native leases contain the normal provision that the tenant is liable for all rates and outgoings on the land. Many Fijians have pointed out that Indian tenants of their land should be made to pay the land rate; but it is difficult to justify this when the system of local government financed by the rate funds is exclusively Fijian. And Fijians have so far resisted all attempts to introduce other races. There has been hesitating acceptance of the principle of no taxation without representation; but the situation remains delicate and, if the rates come in slowly, Fijians may have to face again the possibility of financing their local administration from rates levied on the lessees of their land, with the corollary of admitting to the Provincial Councils which govern the expenditure, those who contribute.

The difficulty of collecting unpaid rates has not been overcome by the change in the law which provides that they shall be recoverable as a civil debt. The tradition of going to gaol for non-payment is time-honoured. Defaulters were put to profitable work by the provinces, such as cleaning district tracks, for which a government grant was payable, or working on provincial farms. Both arrangements gave a financial return to the province to compensate for the missing rates. Since the gaols were maintained by central government, prisoners cost nothing to keep and the provincial funds gained from the arrangements. The more humanitarian system of sueing a man in court for non-payment and ending up by attempting to auction his goods brings its own problems and provinces have, so far, been reluctant to attempt it. Presumably the auction will have to take place in the defaulter's village where his friends and relations are unlikely to bid very enthusiastically to deprive him of his worldly possessions, particularly when the sale is a government action against an omission of which many are, or may be, guilty.

In 1966, the Fijian Affairs Ordinance and Regulations were extensively amended in such a way as to remove the last vestiges of a resemblance to a system of indirect rule from the Fijian Administration. The statutory rights of chiefs of the blood are diminished; and the voice of the electorate is heard in the land.

The changed legislation now provides that the Great Council of Chiefs shall be presided over by the Minister for Fijian Affairs and Local Government. The Council consists of thirty members elected from the fourteen Provincial Councils, the fourteen Fijians elected members of Legislative Council, not more than seven chiefs appointed by the Governor and not more than eight members appointed by the Minister for Fijian Affairs and Local Government. This makes the Council of fifty-nine, of which only seven are necessarily chiefs. The Council has clearly ceased to be the Council of "Chiefs" and has evolved into a Council of elected representatives of

Provincial and Legislative Councils. It has still no legislative or executive authority but may consider legislation affecting the rights and welfare of Fijians which is referred to it by the Governor and make recommendations thereon. The Council acts as a safeguard for Fijian interests in that it may make comments to the Governor on such legislation and also has direct access to Her Majesty the Queen by annual letter from the Council.*

The Fijian Affairs Board is also presided over by the Minister for Fijian Affairs and Local Government. This Board consists of eight of the Fijian members of Legislative Council elected by the Fijian members of Legislative Council, and two members of the Great Council of Chiefs who are not members of Legislative Council, elected by those members of the Great Council of Chiefs who are likewise not members of Legislative Council.

It is thus a wholly elected body, albeit by a process of indirect election. A Legal Adviser and a Financial Adviser are appointed by the Minister for Fijian Affairs and Local Government. The Board has the duty of considering draft legislation relating to the welfare of the Fijian people when referred by the Governor or the Governor-in-Council and is enjoined, by the legislation under which it is set up, to refer matters to the Great Council of Chiefs if they appear to be of vital importance affecting the interests and rights of the Fijian people.

The Board is still empowered to make regulations to be obeyed by all Fijians, subject to the approval of the Governor-in-Council. In practice, however, these powers are rarely used. The Fijian Affairs Board prefers to encourage Provincial Councils to make their own by-laws suitable to local circumstances.

The Board maintains a central secretariat at its headquarters and a treasury which assists the financial work of Provincial Councils and exercises and audit and supervisory function over provincial expenditure.

The Colony is divided into fourteen provinces for the purposes of the Fijian Administration and each province has its own Provincial Council. The membership of these Councils has changed considerably. There are now numbers of elected members, dependent on the population of the various Tikina within the Council; numbers of chiefs nominated by the Minister for Fijian Affairs and Local Government which vary and are again dependent on the population of the Province; and also members who are elected from persons registered as land owners of the Province but resident in towns, townships and closely settled areas of the Colony. The law provides that, in nominating chiefs to be members of a Provincial Council, the Minister shall have regard, so far as is practicable, to Fijian public opinion in the province. There is therefore an elected majority on the Council but provision remains for the hereditary chiefs to be appointed.

Under the reorganisation, the separate system of Fijian courts which heard cases under the Fijian Affairs Board Regulations and Provincial Council By-laws is being gradually withdrawn. Fijian Magistrates are sitting only to hear part-heard cases and, for the future, Fijians will be subject to the same laws as all other residents in the Colony and to no other. The Native Divorce

*The author is writing on the immediate pre-independence position.—Ed.

Ordinance and the Fijian Affairs Board Births and Deaths Regulations which gave Fijians a peculiar status in regard to birth, marriage and death have been repealed.

The Fijian Administration is now a democratically elective system of government for the Fijian people in which it is possible for the view of Fijians at the lowest level to be heard at the top. It may well be that these views are tempered on the way up by reactionary hereditary chiefs, – but at each level of the administration the elected representatives of the people are in the majority. Experience at Provincial Councils has shown that, in those areas of Fiji where there is a tradition of strongly hierarchical authority from hereditary chiefs, there is a tendency for Provincial Councils to proceed cautiously with innovations. To the west of Viti Levu, however, where a more egalitarian form of society has evolved, the Provincial Councils through their representatives are pressing strongly for the most far-reaching reforms aimed at the extension of the power of the electorate and the return to Fijians of a greater measure of control over their lands. The resolution of these difficulties and the reconciliation of Fijian ambitions and the national interest passed, in October 1970, to the government of an independent nation.

The problem of illegal settlers in urban areas of Kedah State, Malaysia

By SYED MANSOR BARAKBAH

Mr. Barakbah is at present Deputy Commissioner of Lands and Mines and Registrar of Titles in the State of Kedah.

Introduction

KEDAH lies in the North of Malaya, and is one of the States of the Federation of Malaysia. The State has an area of 3,660 square miles with most of the coastal areas joined into a coastal alluvial plain which forms the "rice bowl"[1] of Malaysia. The eastern and the south-eastern parts of the State are hilly and are covered with rubber plantations and subsistence holdings, though some of the land there remains under State ownership.

In 1939[2] the total acreage of land was classified thus:—

(a) alienated land = 32 per cent

(b) forest reserve = 27 per cent and

(c) state land = 41 per cent

Tin mining has long been known in Kedah, but the tin is now almost exhausted and the few mines that are operating today are confined to the central and the southern parts of the State. Iron mining is more important in central Kedah, nowadays.

Kedah has a predominantly Malay population, about 75 per cent of whom are peasant farmers and rubber smallholders. The predominance of Malays out of a total population of 783,993 (1961)[3] is not surprising since Kedah, before the creation of the ill fated Malayan Union in 1946, and later the Federation of Malaya in 1948, was an Unfederated Malay State[4] which came under British protection only in 1909. In spite of the fact that Kedah was one of the States that came into contact quite early with the British (which resulted in the founding of Penang, which was then part of Kedah, by Francis Light in 1786)[5], the Unfederated Malay States had British Advisers only while most of the affairs were in Malay hands and Kedah had her own Civil Service. Malay was always the language of the proceedings of the State Council[6] and the interests of the Malays as a whole were well protected. Before 1909 Kedah was vaguely under Siamese Suzerainty.[7]

Towards the end of the 19th century, when the southern Malay States

[1]The word Kedah is derived from either "Quedah", meaning rice bowl in Arabic, or Kedah in one of the Indian languages meaning an enclosure for elephant catching.

[2]*C. K. Meek Land Law and Custom in the Colonies.*

[3]"*Malaysia in Brief*"—Ministry of Information and Broadcasting.

[4]The other Unfederated Malay States were Perlis, Kelantan, Trengganu and Johore.

[5]It is ironical that in 1957 it was a prince from Kedah who achieved independence for the whole of Malaya, and who was destined to become the first Prime Minister of Malaya and later Malaysia.

[6]Malay is now the National Language (Bahasa Malaysia) of the Federation of Malaysia.

[7]Kedah is known to the Thais, even today, as "Saibury".

which were later to become the Federated Malay States were in the chaos and anarchy which led to British intervention, Sir Frank Swettenham had this to say of the State of Kedah:-

> ". . . In 1874 Kedah was more advanced in its instruments of government, in the observance of order, the well-being of its people and the general development of the country, than any other state in the Peninsula . . .The country was highly cultivated within a radius of five or ten miles round Alor Star,[8] the Sultan was a just and upright man of intelligence and his officers were full of good intentions; his chief minister was a man of real enquiry and the people seemed happy and contented. Though the revenue raised must have been small, the country was not in debt."[9]

Today, Kedah is still one of the most heavily cultivated States in Malaysia. Most of her arable land, which is especially fit for rice planting, has been tilled and thus she earns her reputation of being the rice bowl of Malaysia. Even during the chaotic despotism and destitution of the Japanese occupation of Malaya in 1942-1945 Kedah was relatively comfortable in her staple food supply. It is hoped now that with the completion of the Muda River Irrigation Scheme[10] by 1971, double cropping of paddy (rice) can be achieved throughout almost all the paddy lands of Kedah. This double cropping will make Malaysia not only self sufficient in rice, but also an exporter. Most of the land not under paddy is covered with rubber plantations or fruit orchards. However, unalienated State land in Kedah is no longer in abundance; a large area of State land is occupied and cultivated illegally. At present it is not possible to estimate accurately the area of State land that is still available but it is certainly less than half the 41 per cent shown above to have been available in 1939.

Land Tenure

All property rights and powers of control over State land, i.e. land not held under any title in Kedah, are vested in the Ruler;[11] powers of alienation are delegated to the State Executive Council, the Commissioner of Lands and Mines or to Collectors of Land Revenue.[12] Land in Kedah, like the rest of Malaysia, is not a "free good"; at the time of alienation a premium is charged for the land, besides other fees.

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[8]Alor Star is the royal town and the State capital today.

[9]British Malaya – Sir Frank Swettenham.

[10]The Muda River Irrigation Scheme is a US $228 M project financed by the World Bank. Sir William Halcrow and Partners of England are the consultants for this project, the first of its kind in Malaysia.

[11]Under the Constitution of the Federation of Malaysia land is a State matter. See definition of "State authority" in Section 5 of the National Land Code under which this means the "Ruler or the Governor of the State, as the case may be."

[12]The term "Collector of Land Revenue" is now inappropriate considering the various functions of the officer concerned. A recommendation has been made already to change this designation to "Land Administrator". This recommendation, at the time of writing, has been accepted in principle by the State Government of Kedah. See *Land Administration*, a study by the Development-Administration Unit of the Prime Minister's Department.

Land may also be divided into three different classifications, viz:

(a) town land,
(b) village land, and
(c) country land.

It is town land that concerns us in this paper and the value of town land today is extremely high. State land in the towns is virtually non-existent; the few parcels that are available are designated for development for government purposes in the near future. The other vacant parcels in the towns are reserved lands, and these compose:-

(i) public purpose reserves,
(ii) river reserves, and
(iii) road reserves.

These are not available for alienation to individuals under any circumstances. The Town Councils are also able to influence the alienation of town land as they are the planning authorities for their respective towns.

Land[13] and Man are the creations of God. While land is fixed in area, immovable and cannot be reproduced, man is mobile, social and capable of indefinite multiplication in numbers. Man's attempt to recover land from the sea in the form of reclamation has met with very limited success, and has often been very frustrating and expensive. But the number of people is still increasing and it has now reached a point which gives rise to world-wide concern. Every man wants to own land, not only for the provision of food and accommodation, but also as a status symbol. This is even more true of the developing agricultural countries. It is the struggle for a place to build a living that leads to illegal occupation of State and reserve lands in the towns of the State of Kedah.

Illegal Occupation in Townships

There are two main factors which must be borne in mind when considering why illegal occupation in towns is already widespread and still spreading. Firstly, the general weakness in the enforcement and administration of land laws, and secondly the considerable increase in the population of the various towns of the State of Kedah.

(a) *The general weakness in the enforcement and administration of land laws.*

It is said that Kedah was fortunate in the past having had experienced Land Officers[14] and Advisers of Lands[15] to train and guide in various aspects of

[13]The Malaysian National Land Code (Act 56 of 1965) defines "land" as:
(a) the surface of the earth and all substances forming that surface;
(b) the earth below the surface and all substances therein;
(c) all vegetation and other natural products whether or not requiring the periodical application of labour to their production, and whether on or below the surface;
(d) all things attached to the earth or permanently fastened to anything attached to the earth whether on or below the surface; and
(e) land covered by water.

[14]Land Officer was the designation for Collector of Land Revenue in the Kedah Land Enactment of 1932. This designation was changed to Collector of Land Revenue with the coming into effect of the National Land Code.

[15]An Adviser of Land was provided for in the Kedah Land Enactment 56 of 1932 to look into the affairs of land administration. But this appointment was not filled towards the end of British rule in Malaya.

land work. So much so that land administration in pre-war Kedah was said to be among the best in the Malay States. But unfortunately, due to various factors beyond control, land administration in the State (and in fact in the whole of Malaya) has now slackened and is not as sound as it should be. This can be attributed largely to:-

(i) the Japanese occupation of Malaya, during which time Kedah again became "Saibury" under Siamese sovereignty;

(ii) the twelve years of the Emergency 1948-1960; and

(iii) the low priority given to land administration after 1960[16] especially before 1965.

During the Second World War most of the Land Offices in Malaya lost their records and although these have now been replaced, nevertheless three-and-a-half years of corruption, despotism, demoralisation and profiteering during the Japanese Occupation have lowered the standard of administration of land. Not long after the return of the British, there followed a long period of Emergency as a result of Communist terrorism. In order that the fullest resources of district administration should be devoted to ending the Emergency, land administration was given a low priority. The ending of the Emergency in 1960 was immediately followed by a top priority Rural Development drive against rural poverty and ignorance. In consequence, arrears of land work started to accumulate, thereby causing delays and creating suffocating bottle-necks in Land Offices.[17] Even illegal occupation of State land by squatters was tolerated, notably after Merdeka[18] in 1957.

(b) *The considerable increase in the population of towns, especially after Merdeka, 1957.*

The unprecedented increase in the population of the towns of Kedah, notably Alor Star and Sungai Patini (the second biggest town), is mainly due to:-

(i) natural increase, enhanced by the better social services and living standards after the achievement of Merdeka in 1957, and a fall in the mortality rate from 19.4 per 1,000 in 1947 to 9.5 per 1,000 in 1960;[19] and

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[16]Since 1965, however, the importance of land administration has come to be better appreciated with (a) the creation of the Ministry of Lands and Mines; (b) the coming into operation of the National Land Code, 1965, w.e.f. 1.1.1966 and (c) the acceptance of the proposals made by the Development of Administration Unit of the Prime Minister's Department as to:-

(i) the separation (but not divorce) of the Land Office from the general district administration at district level, and

(ii) the adoption of the Unit Assembly System in the day-to-day functions of a Land Officer; – see *Land Administration*, a study by the Development of Admin. Unit of the Prime Minister's Department.

[17]In most districts in Kedah the Land Officers are also the District Officers. As District Officers they have to be chairmen of various anti-Communist organisations and committees and, today, they are chairmen of the executive Rural Development Committees to fight rural poverty and ignorance.

[18]"Merdeka" means Independence.

[19]"*Asian Economic Development*" – Chapter "Malaya" by Lim Chong Wah.

(ii) the drift of the landless and unemployed youths from their rural areas to towns. This drift is itself caused by:-

(a) the attraction of the bright lights and the gay life of the towns;

(b) the search for jobs or better employment;

(c) the closing down of several tin mines due to the exhaustion of resources and also a fall in the price of tin;

(d) the practice of the Islamic Law of Inheritance which leads to uneconomic subdivision of land. Often the heirs have to move away in search of a better income and living;

(e) large-scale acquistion of land, for government projects under the Rural Development drive; this has to some extent displaced smallholders and sometimes severed their economic holdings; and

(f) more recently, the fragmentation[20] of rubber estates by local syndicates, which bought these estates from European firms; this has caused many estate labourers to be unemployed.

When all these people congregate in the towns, they are faced with two big problems, namely, the low wages and the shortage of houses for their living quarters. House rentals in these towns are always high, averaging $30/–[21] per month (excluding local authority rates) for a most modest house that looks just a little better than a hut and which is tolerated by the Town Council only because it was erected before the Council was formed. With an average but unreliable income of not more than $120/– a month as an odd-job labourer, trishaw peddler or taxi driver, and usually with several dependants to feed and clothe, no family head would willingly rent such a house. He prefers instead to settle illegally on a plot of State or reserve land, with a small house of his own construction made from spoiled planks and discarded wood which can be bought very cheaply from the local timber mill. The roof is made of zinc sheeting. Construction of such houses is usually done at night or on holidays, so that the work will not be detected by the watchful eyes of the Land Office or the Town Council employees. As a final touch, the house is treated with dirty motor, or blackish oil so that it looks old and does not attract any attention. The squatter will always prefer state land or possibly river reserve land rather than privately owned land because usually he can expect backing and sympathy from the local politicians against the Collector of Land Revenue. What chance would he have if he were to squat on privately owned land? Besides, the river serves him well for washing purposes, communication and sewage disposal and also as a source of income if he is handy with his fishing rods and nets.

A rough survey, carried out in early 1968 by the various Land Offices in the State, revealed that there are not less than 1,000 families now who are squatters in the various towns of the State. In Alor Star and Sungai Patani alone there are not less than 500 such families. It was also found that they have grouped together into their own colonies of Malays, Chinese or Indians,

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[20] "Fragmentation" in Malaysia is a process which involves sub-division of rubber estates mostly.

[21] £1 sterling = $7.35 (Malaysian).

sometimes forming into syndicates to attract other squatters on payment of a fee.

Towards a solution of the problem

The presence of these squatters on both sides of the river banks and on other reserve lands has become a "headache" to the administration and to the Town Councils, and an "eye-sore" to onlookers. The squatters' attitude and behavour in ignoring the law constitute a sad case of defiance, and also their living conditions are a risk to health and introduce other hazards, not only for themselves but for others as well.

Provision to deal with the situation is made in Section 425 of the National Land Code (Act 56 of 1965) which reads:

"425 (1) Any person who, without lawful authority—

(a) occupies, or erects any buildings on any State Land, reserved land or mining land, or

(b) clears, encloses or cultivates any such land or part thereof, or

(c) cuts any timber or produce on any such land shall be guilty of an offence, and liable on conviction to a fine not exceeding five hundred dollars, or imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months or to both.

(2) The Collector may—

(a) remove from any land any person whom he has reason to believe to be committing an offence under this section; and

(b) remove any building, or take possession in the name of the State Authority of any crop, erected or cultivated on any land in contravention thereof.

(3) The Collector may call upon any police officer for assistance in the exercise of the duty conferred on him by sub-section (2) and it shall be the duty of every police officer to comply with any such request.

(4) The Collector may deliver to a police officer—

(a) any moveable property remaining on land after a person or building has been removed under sub-section (2); and

(b) any of the materials composing a building so removed, and any property or materials so delivered shall be disposed of in accordance with Section 43 of the Police Ordinance 1952."

It is obvious that Collectors of Land Revenue are theoretically in a powerful position to deal with these squatters. But on the other hand it is also very clear, after considering and analysing the motives and plight of these squatters as a whole, that they are there *because of the prevailing social, economic and perhaps political conditions* in the State, and I believe such conditions *cannot be alleviated by the use of the machinery and powers of the Land Office alone.*

It is a simple matter for one to read the National Land Code, to close one's eyes and to declare that the squatters' houses are illegal erections and must be destroyed, using all the might and fury of subsection 2 of section 425.

But to a squatter that construction that he calls a house is his whole world; the only shelter for himself, his wife, his children and perhaps even other dependants. This clumsy house is a home for him to come back to after a long, hard and perhaps frustrating day; to rest and sleep; to forget his misery temporarily and to conserve and recover his energy for the next day's toil in search of a living. His basic needs are very simple indeed, just like the very house he lives in.

The application of Section 425(2) of the N.L.C. and the eventual demolition of his house would deprive him and his wife and children of their shelter and home; where they would all go after that is the big question that remains to be answered. It frequently happens that, soon after the demolition of a group of squatter houses, new squatter houses for a new squatter population are constructed in their place, if no proper and vigilant check is maintained. Such a check is not feasible for a Land Office which is fully occupied and often understaffed in dealing with various other aspects of land administration. To make matters worse, some of the squatters are professional. They construct squatter houses, only to sell them at fat profits, and they escape the power and punishment of the law.

However, it is accepted that the spread of squatters must be checked and they must eventually be eradicated, because they are a source of danger to health and a fire risk and a reflection of an unhealthy social, economic and political situation in a developing country. To tolerate them would be an anachronism in these days of progress and planning. Since they are actually a manifestation of social, economic and perhaps even political ills, therefore to expect the Land Office to carry out the law under Section 425 of the N.L.C. in order to deal with them is not a realistic approach to the overall problem. Though, to some extent, the present structure of a Land Office organization might be able to check the spread of squatter houses by swift application of Section 425(2) whilst these houses are still unoccupied, the real work of eventual eradication must require a comprehensive and well planned policy on the part of the State Government. Alternative building sites or cheap flats for those squatter families who are genuinely deserving must be provided. Otherwise, they will become the "homeless class" which have nowhere to go like those in London and Birmingham[22] or in Calcutta and Bombay.

It is suggested that, to check and eventually to stop the spread of squatter houses, a proper survey and census of their number should be carried out, perhaps by means of periodical aerial photography. A register of these houses with their owners' names and particulars as to income, dependants and employment must be kept. On the closing date of the survey, a declaration should be made that any more illegal erection of squatter houses will be dealt with according to the provisions of Section 425 of the N.L.C. without any further leniency. All action under Section 425 should be taken swiftly before the completion and occupation of any such house. But for those illegal houses which have been registered and numbered in the survey, a Temporary Occupation Licence and a Temporary Building Licence (from the Town

[22] *The Sun*, Monday December 9th, 1968, "Nowhere to Go".

Council) would be issued, on a strictly year-to-year basis. In this way, the Government could not only check the spread of any more squatter houses, but also derive at least a little revenue from them.

The next move on the part of the Government as State Authority would be to tackle the problem of removal of existing squatter houses and other illegal occupations of State land in the towns. This is an enormous task which demands careful planning and dedication, with also a sense of purpose and urgency. It is proposed that:

(a) All State lands in the towns which are occupied under T.O.L.s for the purpose of a building site as agreed by the Town Council concerned, or are being occupied illegally for the purpose of a dwelling house, and which are no longer required for any Government purposes should be replanned according to a compromise between actual occupation and the layout plan already prepared by the Town Council. The demarcated parcels should then be alienated to the occupants or the holders of the T.O.L.s as the case may be on condition that they move their houses if necessary to accord with the compromise plan. And the professional or opportunist squatters would receive no further consideration.

(b) Since no river reserve, road reserve, burial ground reserve or any other reserve can be alienated and so be used for the settlement of squatters, the Government must make provision for low cost houses or flats for squatters to go to *before* any action for eviction under Section 425 (2) of the N.L.C. is taken against them. Or perhaps the Government can create new villages[23] in the vicinity of the towns concerned on the model of the existing villages that were formed during the Emergency. In them the squatters could have new homes and lands of their own to cultivate.

The problems created by illegal occupation of State land and reserve land in the towns of Kedah (and perhaps other towns in the Federation of Malaysia) are, to my mind, the result of the social and economic conditions prevailing in the country. They must be tackled comprehensively from both the social and the economic angles. Up to date the Federal and State Governments have done much over the implementation of:

(i) the Rural Development Drive;

(ii) the various land schemes under the Federal Land Development Authority and the State Government;

(iii) the Muda River Irrigation Scheme;

(iv) Family Planning measures; and

(v) careful consideration and investigation before the acquistion of land, as ruled by the State Executive Council of Kedah.[24]

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[23]The new villages were in fact the forerunners of the present schemes in Malaysia. At the height of the Emergency people who lived in scattered rural areas were brought together into new villages so as to free them from Communist influence and contact. Lands and houses were given them at nominal prices with other amenities provided by the Government. More than half a million people, mostly Chinese, were involved in this operation.

[24]State of Kedah Ex-Co paper 18/68, dated 16 January, 1968.

Though the Government has also done much in the construction of cheap housing in the major towns, yet the number of squatters in these towns is still increasing. Their plight and problems should not be taken too lightly. They are in a true sense the victims of lack of education and guidance, landlessness and underemployment. To leave them to the mercy of Section 425(2) of the National Land Code is most unrealistic. This would not only be inhuman and morally unjustifiable but it would also spread frustration amongst land administrators in general and bring the National Land Code into disrepute.

Local Government Finance in the Western State of Nigeria

By F. AKIN OLALOKU*

Mr. Olaloku is now in the Department of Economics, Dalhousie University, Nova Scotia.

Introduction

ALTHOUGH the existence of the unit of government at the local level in the Western State as elsewhere in the country is of a fairly long origin, in fact preceding that of the State Government itself, the real significance of local government finance in this State only dates back to 1952 – the beginning of what one can call modern local government.[1] Accordingly, the examination of the finances of the Local Government Authorities in the Western State will be limited to the period from 1952 onwards when the apparatus of local budgeting in the form of regularized accounting of local revenue and expenditure buttressed by the financial control machinery built into the State/Local Government fiscal relationships as they exist today first took effect.

By properly defining the scope and jurisdiction of the Local Government Authorities in the State, the 1952 Law gives specific expression to the nature and variety of duties and functions to be performed by these authorities in their respective areas of jurisdiction. It is in the task of carrying out these duties and functions over the years that the importance of local government finance in the Western State as elsewhere really lies. These functions are largely in the form of the provision of services by the Local Authorities for the people of the areas under their authority. Section 71 of the 1952 Law gives a long list of these functions: they include *inter alia* the provision of drinking water, disposal of refuse and sewage, protection against criminals, the provision of recreational facilities, like parks etc., protection against fire, the provision of education, health and other social services like relief and welfare, construction of streets, roads and buildings and the carrying out of business enterprises.

Fundamentally, the finances of Local Government Authorities are closely related to the variety of services they provide, therefore the main problem of local government finance is essentially one connected with the raising of the necessary funds needed to provide the services which are required of them, and which have been expanding steadily in recent years. This expansion is partly a reflection of the increased scope of Local Government Authorities' activities and partly a reflection of the changes brought about by the process of economic development both in the form of urban and rural development as well as of population movements from rural to urban areas.

While the foregoing factors have led to a fast rate of growth in the expendi-

*The study for this article was undertaken when the author was Research Fellow in Economics at the Institute of Administration, University of Ife, Ibadan, Nigeria.

[1]It has become the practice among writers on Western Nigerian Local Government to refer to local administration before the 1952 Law as "native administration", and the system since 1952 as "local government". This is in fact an error in semantics. Every administration at the local level is local government of a sort; the real distinction between the brand of local administration before 1952 and the one thereafter is that while the latter is legally clothed and much more democratic, the former is not, and on the basis of this distinction, the latter can simply be referred to as modern local government.

ture of the Local Authorities, the growth of the necessary revenue to finance such expenditure has been at a much slower rate. In consequence one of the most pressing and persistent problems of local government finance in the Western State is that of financial non-viability[2] on the part of the Local Authorities.

The General Financial Picture

Before looking into the revenue structure of the local authorities, let us first take a look at the growth trends of both their revenue and expenditure. Table 1 provides a summary of the revenue and expenditure of the local authorities between 1952/53 and 1966/67. This summary indicates that although both magnitudes increased sharply over the period, expenditure increased at a much faster rate. Looking at the period as a whole, except for four of the fifteen years, three of which were years of budget surpluses and one where the budgets just balanced, all the other eleven years were years of deficits indicating on the one hand the much faster rate of expenditure growth as compared with that of revenue and on the other hand a converging pressure on local revenue capacity. This pressure can also be looked at from another point of view. Table 1 shows that revenue rose from some £1.4 million in 1952/53 to £5.7m in 1966/67 – an increase of 307.1 per cent, i.e. revenue more than trebled, expenditure increased from £1.3 million in 1952/53 to £6.2 million in 1966/67 – an increase of 377.0 per cent, representing an almost four-fold increase.

TABLE 1

Revenue and Expenditure of Local Government Authorities in the Western State 1952/53 – 1966/67.

Year	*Revenue* £'000	*Expenditure* £'000	*Revenue Expenditure Gap* £'000
1952–53	1,350	1,281	69
1953–54	1,566	1,510	56
1954–55	1,381	2,467	—1086
1955–56	3,227	4,119	892
1956–57	5,321	5,321	0
1957–58	5,973	5,773	200
1958–59	6,846	7,034	—188
1959–60	5,880	6,019	—139
1960–61	6,033	6,557	—524
1961–62	5,587	5,838	—251
1962–63	4,842	5,882	—1040
1963–64	4,673	5,041	—368
1964–65	6,370	6,541	—171
1965–66	6,013	6,234	—221
1966–67	5,722	6,221	—499

NOTE: All figures exclude the Mid-Western State.

SOURCE: Western Nigeria, Statistical Bulletin Vol. 1, No. 2, Dec. 1959 and Vol. IX, Nos. 1 and 2 June and Dec. 1967.

[2]Financial non-viability in this context is simply the inability of a local government authority to provide the necessary revenue needed for the financing of all its services.

The preceding analysis brings out clearly that the persistent and continuously widening revenue-expenditure gap of the Local Authorities over the last few years constitutes a great pressure on their revenues. This is the critical problem of local government finance in the Western State as at present and this lends great urgency to a full scale review of local revenue sources. The rest of this article will address itself to this problem. Greater attention will be paid to the revenue side of the problem of local government finance; this is primarily because of the author's personal conviction that the future of Local Authorities in the Western State of Nigeria really lies not so much in their financial prudence in the form of strict economy in public spending (though this is also important), but mainly in the revitalization of their revenue capacity.

There is also another reason for concentrating on the revenue rather than the expenditure side of the problem. It is hoped that by so doing much repetition will be avoided because other studies[3] in the past had devoted great attention to this area of local government finance.

The Revenue Structure: An Over-View

Table 2 shows a summary of the revenues of the local authorities by source for the years 1952/53 and 1966/67. The data provided in this Table indicate quite clearly the great reliance on taxes and rates as a major source of revenue especially since 1957/58 when grants from the State Government became of diminished importance. Taxes and rates together make up almost two thirds of local revenues in 1966/67.

The various shares of the major revenue sources for a typical fiscal year are presented in Figure 1 on page 214.

Both in absolute and relative terms taxes and rates increased very sharply over the period rising from £0.9 million in 1952/53 to £3.6 million in 1966/67 – an increase of 302.7 per cent. As a ratio of total revenue, they represent 46.2 per cent and 63.0 per cent in 1952/53 and 1966/67 respectively.

Grants to local government authorities by the State Government are as much a major source of local revenues as taxes and rates; in fact they were much more important before 1957/58 after which they declined following a change in the State Government's grant policy – we shall elaborate more on this later.

Fines and fees also show an upward trend both relatively and absolutely. Over the period as a whole, they more than tripled rising from £0.2 million in 1952/53 to £1.1 million in 1966/67. Although they increased somewhat over the period, fines and fees as a ratio of total revenue did not maintain a stable position; they rose from 12.6 per cent in 1952/53 to 18.6 per cent in 1966/67.

The other sources of revenue in Table 2, under the "General" and "Trade

[3] See inter alia G. O. Orewa, *Report on the Problems of Local Government Finance in Western Nigeria* (ARGA 19, 1963), Chapt. 5 and Local Government Finance in Nigeria (O.U.P. 1966), Chapts. 9 and 10.

and Industry" Heads are of much lesser importance. Although they represented some sizeable proportion of total revenue at the beginning of the period they have declined sharply ever since. For example, while General Revenue accounted for 24.0 per cent of total revenue in 1952/53 it was only 4.2 per cent in 1966/67. The ratio of the revenue from Trade and Industry has declined in a similar manner from 4.6 per cent in 1952/53 to 1.0 per cent in 1966/67.

In discussing changes in revenue over time, it is important to take into account the effect of both population and price level changes in order to be able to make a valid comparison between different dates. For example, one good way to estimate the tax burden is to make a calculation of per capita revenue. Again, since the tax burden borne by individual tax payers is measured in terms of the purchasing power given up as a result of the tax paid, it is more meaningful because of the continuous increases in the price level over time to convert revenues from current to constant prices. Table 2 provides this additional information.

TABLE 2

Western State: Aggregate and Per Capita* Local Government Revenue at Current Prices 1952/53 and 1966/67 and at constant Prices

Revenue by Source	*Aggregate Revenue at current prices*			*Per Capita Revenue at current prices*		
	1952/53 £'000	1966/67 £'000	*Change in % terms*	1952/53 *s. d.*	1966/67 *s. d.*	*Change in % Terms*
Taxes and Rates	895	3,605	303	4 0	7 0	75.0
Fines and Fees	244	1,066	337	10	2 0	140.0
General	466	241	—48	2 5	6	—79.3
Trade and Industry	89	59	—34	—	—	—
Grants	244	750	207	10	1 7	90.00
Total	1,938	5,721	195	8 1	11 1	37.1

*Population figures are based on the 1952 and 1963 population Censuses.

NOTE: Figures for fiscal year 1952/53 include those of the Mid-Western State.

SOURCE: (i) Western State of Nigeria, Statistical Bulletin, Vol. V, Nos. 1 and 2, June and December 1963 and Vol. ix, Nos. 1 and 2, June and December, 1967.

(ii) Ministry of Economic Planning and Social Development, Ibadan, Abstract of Local Government Statistics Vol. II, No. 2 December, 1967.

(iii) Last column based on the Ibadan consumer price index compiled by the Federal Office of Statistics.

FIGURE 1

Western State: Local Government Revenues by Source 1966/67

		per cent
1	Taxes and rates	63.0
2	Fines and fees	18.6
3	Grants	13.2
4	General	4.2
5	Trade and industry	1.0

SOURCE: Derived from Table 2 above.

Certain differences emerge in local revenue behaviour over the period under review if we consider the foregoing factors. For example, the big jump in aggregate local revenues at current prices registered in Table 2 becomes much smaller when the increase over the period is considered in terms of per capita revenue or when aggregate revenues at current prices are deflated at some constant price.

Analysis of Revenue Sources

The revenue sources available to Local Authorities in the Western State are those specifically enumerated in the 1952 Law (Sections 99 and 112). These sources may be summarised as follows: proceeds from rates, whether general or specific; the amount of money transferable to Local Authorities as their share of income tax; revenues from licences, permits, dues, charges or fees; grants-in-aid from the State Government; interest on invested funds.

For the purpose of the analysis to follow, we shall divide these local revenue sources into two groups namely, tax sources and non tax sources.

Tax Sources

The 1952 law limits the taxation powers of local authorities to the imposition of rates only, all other taxation powers reside in the State Government. Local authorities are by the Direct Taxation Ordinance, 1948, authorised to collect and share the proceeds of the income tax with the State Government; this in itself does not amount to much since these authorities are precluded from using the income tax (either by changing its rate or its base) to meet their revenue needs as they see fit. In other words, Local Govern-

ment Authorities administer the income tax, enjoy a share of its collection but have no say in its imposition or rate. This is in conformity with the general practice of state governments the world over: the most lucrative sources of revenue are invariably the perquisites of the state.

By denying them access to wider revenue sources, local authorities are subjected to excessive financial dependence on their state governments and in cases where the latter have failed to make good whether consciously or unconsciously, any revenue losses as a result of their restrictive tax powers, non-viability becomes the fate of local authorities. This has been their plight in the Western State in the last few years.

The origin of the income tax sharing as it exists today between the State and Local Authorities lies in the provision of Section 20 of the Direct Taxation Ordinance 1948, whereby a proportion of income tax proceeds became transferable to these authorities in recognition of their role as collectors of the tax. This position was reversed in 1957 when the Income Tax Law of that year enabled the then Regional Government to take over a new Regional Income Tax, leaving the authorities to rely on the imposition and collection of general and specific rates varying in accordance with their revenue needs. In other words, no limitation was placed on them regarding the maximum of such general or specific rates.

This power granted to local authorities was revoked by the Income Tax (Amendment) Law and the Local Government (Amendment) Law, 1960. These two amendments abolished the education and general rates imposed by the authorities and authorized them once more to collect the regional income tax from all tax-payers with the provision to subsidize out of the proceeds any short-fall between the income tax proceeds accruing to the local authorities and the revenue that should have been realized from the rates abolished. This short-fall was expected to arise since the incidence of the rates was generally higher than the rate of income tax. According to Orewa,[4] it was this equalization subsidy that enabled the local authorities to keep their services fully going in the first year following the 1960 Income Tax (Amendment) Law. But thereafter, they began to run into financial difficulties because as Orewa put it, ". . . contrary to section 65B(3) of the Income Tax (Amendment) Law, 1960 (which stated that tax revenue collected from all tax payers was to go to the respective councils), the Regional Government did not pay to the councils, the full tax from salary and wage earners under the Pay As You Earn system introduced in April, 1961."[5] As a result the then Regional Government was responsible for £1 million and more being overdue to local authorities over the next year or so.[6] This position was further aggravated after April, 1962 when the regional government assumed responsibility for the collection of income tax in respect of tax-payers on incomes above £300. To make good any revenue losses on the part of the local authorities from the tax equalization subsidy which automatically lapsed following this change, they were allowed to collect a Development Contribution of 6d. in the pound from self-employed tax payers with

[4]*Report on the Problems of Local Government Finance*, op. cit. p. 29.
[5]*Ibid.* pp. 29-30.
[6]For further details about this, see Orewa, *op. cit.* p. 30.

incomes not exceeding £300. This, however, has done little to offset the loss of their share of regional income tax.[7]

This brief historical review of the State/Local Government experience of income tax sharing in the Western State over the last few years highlights the financial hazards to which Local Authorities have been exposed. Recently the dimension of this problem has increased. The extent of the State Government's indebtedness to local authorities in respect of their share of income tax had by 1969 mounted to £1,225,000 – an amount representing as much as 20 per cent of their total revenue in a typical fiscal year. There are 114 Local Authorities – Table 3 sets out the position. Ten Local Government Authorities are cited in particular because the State Government is much more indebted to them than to the others, and also because they happen to be the more highly urbanized or semi-urbanized Local Authorities in the State. With £708,000 owing to these ten authorities, it is clear that the loss of revenue due from the State has hit the urban areas much the most heavily. The pressure on revenue capacity is therefore much more severe on them especially as it is these same authorities that are faced with much more rapid increases in expenditure to solve the ever-increasing social and other problems of urbanization; adversely affected most of all Ibadan City, one of the largest urban areas in Africa.

TABLE 3

The Extent of the Western State Government's Indebtedness to its Local Authorities in Respect of the Proceeds of Income Tax Collected Under PAYE on Incomes of £300 and Below to Date.

Local Government Authority	*Amount Due* £'000	*As % of Total*
Ibadan City Council	291	23.8
Akure District Council	79	6.4
Abeokuta Urban District Council	77	6.3
Ife Divisional Council	55	4.5
Ondo Central District Council	41	3.3
Oshogbo District Council	41	3.3
Oyo Southern Council	34	2.8
Egba-Ifo District Council	33	2.7
Owo District Council	32	2.6
Ilesha Urban District Council	25	2.1
Others	517	42.2
TOTAL	1,225	100

SOURCE: Compiled from the Western State Ministry of Local Government and Chieftaincy Affairs, Ibadan.

[7]The Regional Government later adopted a policy of paying back the proceeds of the PAYE tax on lower incomes to the Local Government Authorities but the formula for such payments was not clearly laid down, and they have been made very irregularly with arrears for several years often outstanding.

By the State Government withholding the share of income tax due to Local Authorities, the latter have faced financial embarrassment and helped to create the sad state of non-viability typical of Western local authorities. In view of this, one cannot but regret the State Government's recent decision to take over the basic and essential services provided by these authorities on the pretext of their financial non-viability which the State Government itself has helped to bring about. The solution to this problem, as one sees it, is not in the take-over of essential local services, because this will in fact amount to defeating the fundamental purpose of government at the local level, but one of readjusting the fiscal imbalance between the State Government and the local authorities. If the local authorities are expected to continue to perform effectively their essential and traditional role, the State Government must needs create the necessary fiscal environment by the appropriate income tax sharing policy whereby these authorities can become much more financially equipped to perform this task. Local authorities should not be looked upon as competitive in their role with the state government itself, because essentially the role of local authorities is complementary with that of the State Government whose agencies they are for the performance of functions delegated to them; what they need is financial support like any other agency of the State (a Housing Corporation, a Water Corporation, a Development Corporation etc.) to make them viable.

Quite apart from the financial instability suffered by the local authorities as a result of the unpredictable nature of the State Government's income tax-sharing policies, the proceeds from the category of income tax at present effectively assigned to them, though substantial,[8] does not appear to be sufficiently marginally productive to meet their continuously increasing revenue needs. For example, between 1963/64 and 1966/67, although their revenue from this source (which has become by far one of the most important source in recent years) increased by 21.7 per cent – an average of about 5.4 per cent, this is lower than the average annual rate of increase of 6 per cent in their expenditures over the same period.

Rates in Western Nigeria as in many other countries constitute an important tax-source of local revenue but restrictions imposed by the State Government have prevented local authorities from exercising sufficient freedom in the use of rates.

Although the 1952 Law lays it down that local authorities in the State can impose and collect rates according to their revenue needs, in effect, the State Government has prevented this. At one time or the other, the power to impose and collect certain rates had been revoked; mention has already been made of the action taken in 1960 whereby the powers of local authorities to levy general and education rates were abolished and no satisfactory fiscal alternative was devised by the State Government to make good the consequential revenue loss.

[8]For example in fiscal 1965/66, the proceeds from this category of income tax constituted 88.0 per cent of the total yield of income tax from all self-employed tax payers and 52.4 per cent of the total yield of income tax from all categories of tax-payers.

The take-over by the State Government of local services which were in the past financed from the proceeds from special rates has resulted in further loss to local authorities. For instance, the assumption of responsibility for the provision of pipe-borne water by the newly created State Water Corporation has deprived them of their power to levy water rates. Forestry fees is another source of local revenue recently lost with the take-over of this function by the State Government. Another feature of local revenue from rates is that its level now depends on the extent to which the State Government is ready to approve particular rates which particular local authorities propose to introduce. This power of approval represents another source of restriction which tends to limit the revenue capacity of these authorities.

Such policies of the State Government are reflected in the fluctuating trend of revenue from rates in recent years. Table 4 shows this pattern clearly over a period of five years for which figures are available, and highlights the present predicament of local authorities now in receipt of scarcely half the rate revenue of 1962.[9]

TABLE 4

Western State: Local Government Authorities' Revenue from Rates: 1962/63 – 1966/67.

Year	*Revenue from Rates* £m.
1962/63	1.4
1963/64	2.9
1964/65	3.8
1965/66	1.7
1966/67	0.8

SOURCES: (i) Western State of Nigeria, Statistical Bulletin Vol. IX, Nos. 1 and 2, June and December, 1967.

(ii) Ministry of Economic Planning and Social Development, Ibadan, Abstracts of Local Government Statistics, Vols. I and II, Nos. 1 and 2, December, 1966 and 1967.

Non-Tax Sources other than State Government Grants-in-Aid.

The non-tax sources of local revenue in the Western State are very wide-ranging. This category includes those that are headed "Fines and Fees", "General" and "Trade and Industry" in the Estimates of local authorities. The "General" Head is made up of revenues in the form of income from investments and the like, while the "Trade and Industry" Head includes revenues from the profits of commercially run enterprises.

[9]For further study of the issues involved see G. O. Orewa *Report on the Problems of Local Government Finance in Western Nigeria, op. cit. Chapt.* 6; *Taxation in Western Nigeria* (O.U.P. 1962), *Chapt.* 2; *Local Government Finance in Nigeria* (O.U.P. 1966), *Chapt.* 12.

As Table 2 has shown, revenue from these non-tax sources is quite substantial, but it cannot be estimated with accuracy, for its yield depends on variables which are much beyond the control of local authorities, such as the volume of litigation, marriages, births and deaths. Regular and growing revenue from investments can only depend on the availability of surplus funds which, as we have seen, these authorities have lacked in recent years. It appears therefore that the local authorities can do very little to improve their revenue yield from these sources.

Given a readily available source of investible funds on the one hand, and efficient management on the other, trade and industry represent an area where great improvement in revenue yield can be achieved. Perhaps one way to overcome the shortage of funds for running business enterprises is for local authorities to borrow as this is one area where local borrowing can be justified. This is an area, however, where inefficiency and mismanagement can cause heavy losses to be incurred.[10] The problem of efficient management can but be overcome by the employment of experts in the running of business enterprises, since the major cause of the failure of many ventures in the past has been the entrusting of these ventures into incompetent hands.

State Government Grants-in-Aid

The traditional reason why State Governments give financial assistance in the form of grants-in-aid to their local government authorities is that such financial support enables them to perform well those specific functions which the State Government would like to see them perform.* General grants are also made. The grants given by the Western State Government to the Local Government Authorities in the State at present fall mainly under the first category above, i.e. they are grants made available to assist the financing of certain local functions. These can be summarized briefly as follows:

(i) 10 per cent of approved estimated or actual expenditure on medical and health services, whichever is less plus a fixed sum (at present 4d.) which is chargeable for each attendance by a person under 18 years of age at a local government Authority dispensary; this is in respect of the free medical scheme.

(ii) 100 per cent of the salaries of teachers in local government authorities' primary schools;

(iii) 100 per cent of the salaries of approved administrative and Supervisory Staff employed by Local Education Authorities;

(iv) 100 per cent of the salaries of adult education organisers plus assistance towards the cost of publications and equipment;

(v) grants payable at varying rates per mile in respect of certain categories of roads maintained by the Local Government Authorities;

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[10]The Ibadan City Bus Service is a notable example. This local authority enterprise has suffered losses as a result of mismanagement. Its inefficient operation in the past led to the creation recently of an independent Transport Board to look after its running. Orewa also cites the example of the Egba Divisional Printing Press that had to be closed down because of persistent losses; c.f. *Report on the Problems of Local Government Finance*, *op. cit.* p. 28.

*And which they would not otherwise be able to afford (Ed.)

(vi) 50 per cent of the salaries of the members of the Unified Local Government Service;

(vii) 50 per cent of approved estimated or actual expenditure on the clearance of inland waterways, whichever is less.

Former grants-in-aid in respect of water rates and local police costs will now lapse automatically with the assumption of responsibility for the former by the recently created State Water Corporation and the unification of the latter with the Nigerian Police Force.

All the payments in the form of grants-in-aid from the State Government to the Local Government Authorities in respect of the foregoing functions constitute a substantial proportion of their total revenue, although there has been a decline in their relative importance in the last few years. This is indicated quite clearly in Table 5 below.

TABLE 5

Western State Government Grants-in-Aid to Local Government Authorities: 1952/53 – 1966/67.

Year	*Total Revenue* £'000	*Total Grants* £'000	*Grants as % of Total Revenue*
1952–53	1,350	181	13.4
1956–57	5,321	2,970	55.8
1958–59	6,846	2,902	42.4
1961–62	5,587	1,037	18.6
1966–67	5,722	750	13.1

NOTE: All figures exclude the Mid-West State.

SOURCE: Western State of Nigeria, Statistical Bulletin Vol. 1, No. 2, Dec. 1959, and Vol. IX, Nos. 1 and 2, June and December, 1967.

According to this table, grants rose sharply from a low of £181,000 in 1952/53 (13.4 per cent of total revenue) to a peak of almost £3 million in 1956/57 (55.8 per cent of total revenue). Thereafter, they declined gradually reaching a relatively low level of £750,000 or 13.1 per cent of total local revenue in 1966/67.

The escalation in grants from 1955/56, was due primarily if not exclusively to the introduction of free primary education and free medical care, the financing of which was heavily grant-aided by the State Government. The downward trend after 1958/59 is explained by the change in the State Government's policy towards education grants which had constituted the bulk of total grants. From 1959, all grants in respect of the salaries of voluntary agency teachers were paid to the voluntary agencies directly instead of through the agency of local authorities.

One unfortunate feature of the grants pattern is their downward turn at a period when the upward pressure on local authorities' expenditure has continued unabated. Worse still, although one cannot quantify in the absence

of data the extent of the State Government's indebtedness to the Local Government Authorities in respect of the statutorily specified grants-in-aid enumerated above, there exists a general complaint among local authorities that a considerable sum remains unpaid.

Analysis of Alternative Revenue Sources

Judging from the limitations on the revenue capacity of Local Government Authorities which comes out so clearly from the preceding analysis and given the fact that their future revenue requirements will continue to grow, the pertinent question to consider is whether there are other possible sources of loyal revenue to supplement existing ones so that adequate financial resources can be insured for the future.

Property rates or tax

The 1952 Law mentions property rate as one of the sources of revenue that can be used by Local Government Authorities in the Western State, but to date (except for a brief trial by the Abeokuta Urban District Council), it is virtually unknown in the State. The introduction of property rating has been recommended as a very suitable supplement to existing local revenue sources. The main arguments in favour of introducing this tax are its relative superiority over the local income tax both from the point of view of revenue yield as well as administration. The arguments in this connection are familiar as they have been put forward on a number of occasions.[11] Briefly, these arguments for the property rate, are the relatively higher elasticity and stability of the revenue yield, the localization of its base making for easy valuation and assessment on the one hand and ruling out the possibility of evasion on the other.

With the present stringent financial position of the local authorities in the State, it is surprising that there is reluctance on their part to introduce this tax. The explanation offered for this attitude is partly political and partly administrative. Politically, the hostility is feared of those who would bear the incidence of the tax as was the experience with the Abeokuta Urban District Council. The situation under the present military regime offers an excellent opportunity to introduce the property tax as a permanent feature of the local fiscal system without interference from political objectors.

The administrative problem of operating a property tax in the State mainly concerns the nature of property ownership and the type of planning and urban development in most of the towns in the State. The usual argument in the case of the former is that the ownership of property which has to do with the form of social ties is so diversified that it becomes so difficult if not impossible to identify one single individual as the owner of the property who should bear the incidence of the tax. This is very common where a property may belong to a whole family made up of many individuals. In the latter case it is argued that owing to the bad layout of houses in the high density zones of most cities in the State it will be very difficult to value, assess and collect taxes on property.

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[11]For more details of these arguments see G. O. Orewa *Taxation in Western Nigeria* (O.U.P. 1962), chapt. 10, U.K. Hicks, *Development from Below: Local Government Finance in the Developing Countries of the Commonwealth*, (O.U.P. 1961), p. 353.

While all these arguments may be valid, they offer no justification for the failure to use the tax where it can be limited to certain areas of cities to which the above difficulties do not apply. There are categories of property which do not present the administrative problems enumerated above and can therefore be taxed fairly easily. As U. K. Hicks has observed: "In a large town like Ibadan, it is surely a short-sighted policy to allow substantial office and commercial buildings to escape all responsibility for the urban services they enjoy".[12] What is more some of the more urbanized Local Government Authority areas in the State have been experiencing a building boom in recent years and most of these modern buildings are well laid out and easily identifiable both in terms of location and ownership. Their valuation and assessment will therefore present no administrative problem. By limiting a property tax to this category of property at least initially, the administrative problems envisaged will be minimized.

Local Borrowing

Loan finance can provide a principal means whereby capital expenditure can be undertaken for a wide variety of public enterprise for which surplus funds do not exist, and whereby the burden is borne, equitably, by present and future taxpaying beneficiaries.

There are so many types of public works expenditure which, if financed through borrowing by the Local Government Authorities in the Western State, will not only be conforming to the desirable basic principles of local borrowing, but will also be relieving themselves of the present pressure on their revenue capacity. As observed earlier on, the reason for the inadequate contribution of the "Trade and Industry" Head to the revenue of the Local Government Authorities is their inability to provide investible funds for the financing of self-supporting or revenue yielding undertakings out of their ordinary local revenue. This is an area where local borrowing can make good this non-availability of investible funds. Provided that the commercial undertakings to be financed by local borrowing will be efficiently managed, the revenue to be earned can be used both for servicing the debt and for enhancing revenue potential.[13]

Although Section 101 of the 1952 Law categorically states that Local Government Authorities have power to "raise loans within Nigeria of such amounts, from such sources, in such manner, and upon such conditions",[14] as the then Regional Authority may approve, such a power has been little used and in fact in some cases it has not been used at all. One important factor responsible for this is the limited sources of loanable funds brought

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[12] U.K. Hicks, *op.cit.* p. 353

[13] The case of the former Onitsha Urban County Council cited by Orewa in his *Report on the Problems of Local Government Finance* op. cit. p. 74, is of relevance here if only as a source of encouragement to Local Government Authorities elsewhere. This particular Local Government Authority took a loan of £½ million from the former Eastern Nigeria Development Corporation for the building of a market. This loan was being repaid with interest at the rate of £36,000 annually met out of a total annual revenue of £72,000 from the market. This leaves this Local Authority with a gross revenue of £36,000 and when the annual current expenditure on maintenance and Staff Salaries is taken from this, the Council is still left with a net revenue of £32,000.

[14] Quoted in P. J. Harris, *Local Government in Southern Nigeria* (Cambridge University Press, 1957), p. 100.

about by the statutorily imposed limitations on local borrowing. For example, if the raising of loans is limited to Nigeria, then the sources of loanable funds would be fewer than otherwise, much more so in a relatively underdeveloped monetary and financial environment like Nigeria.

The possible sources of loanable funds for the local authorities in the Western State within Nigeria are the State Government itself, the State Development Corporation and private financial institutions especially the commercial banks. The availability of loanable funds from the first source is limited because of the growing volume of development programmes to which the State Government is itself committed. The second source is also unlikely to satisfy the borrowing needs of local authorities because of the legal restrictions which limit the scope of the State Development Corporation for providing loan finance for projects. The commercial banks too are a source of limited funds only because, as a matter of policy, they do not usually lend long-term and long-term loans are what local authorities need most. Even in the few exceptions for which commercial banks may be willing to lend long-term, lack of guarantee in the form of sufficient collateral on the part of the local authorities has not proved encouraging to the banks.

These difficulties tend to emphasize the important role the State Government can play in providing loan finance to those local authorities which can provide strong justification for such a loan and the State Government can design its own test for measuring such justification. Secondly, the statutory restriction placed on the State's Development Corporation can be relaxed to accommodate the granting of loans for the financing of certain local government projects which are ruled out at present. Thirdly, the State Government can persuade commercial banks, especially the indigenous ones over which it has some influence (the National Bank and the Co-operative Bank are cases in point) to relax their policy of refusing to lend long-term and in cases where these banks are willing to lend but are doubtful of the credit worthiness of the Local Government Authorities concerned the State Government can stand ready to guarantee such loans.

The 1952 Law by limiting local borrowing to Nigeria, rules out possible external sources of loanable funds that could be available to Local Government Authorities. Although the Nigerian Federal Constitution confers no external borrowing powers on the States, let alone the Local Government Authorities under them, the State Government can through the support and approval of the Federal Government negotiate loans externally on behalf of particular Local Government Authorities.[15]

One possible source of loanable funds on which Local Government Authorities can be expected to rely to some extent in the nearest future is the newly established but rapidly developing Lagos Stock Exchange – a Nigerian capital market which is still in its development stages. As the Nigerian capital market develops, Local Government Authorities may be able to borrow by placing on it local bonds, stocks and securities backed by the guarantee of the State Government. While still on this question of

[15]The U.S.A.I.D. loan made available to the Ibadan City Council for the Ibadan Water Scheme, which has now been taken over by the State Water Corporation was contracted in this way.

institutional sources of loanable funds for local borrowing, one can venture to make a suggestion. Given the important role that Local Authorities could be expected to play in the State's development during the years ahead, might not the State Government initiate the establishment of an institution along the lines of the British Public Works Loan Board[16] which can provide long term loans for Local Government Authorities?

Conclusion and Suggestions

The foregoing survey of the finances of the local authorities in the Western State has demonstrated the severe pressure on their revenue capacity. The major question that arises from the survey therefore is how to provide the large amount of additional local revenue that will be needed. The existing pressure on local revenue capacity would probably not be as great if the local tax effort, i.e. efficiency in local tax administration were greater. Widespread tax evasion and avoidance which reduce the revenue yield of local taxes, and the lack of vigour on the part of the local authorities to combat these, reflect the relatively low tax effort of these authorities. Other related problems of local tax administration like under-assessment which is usually prompted by political factors and the inability to bring to book all the potential tax payers in the State have also limited the revenue yield of the local income tax. The truth is that the local taxes employed by the local authorities in the Western State today have not actually reached their capacity so that a greater tax effort by way of a drastic reduction in tax evasion and avoidance and more accurate assessment will yield a great dividend in the form of greater revenue. But granting this, there is usually a limit to which particular taxes can be exploited and once this limit is reached increased tax effort becomes of little value.

Most important of all is to place the State/Local Government fiscal relationship on a firm and mutually satisfactory sound basis. The State should not fall into arrears over payments lawfully due to authorities. Consideration we feel should be given to granting to the authorities full responsibility for the collection and accounting of income tax in the £1 – £300 bracket. In other words, the suggestion is that this category of income tax be assigned to them effectively and not nominally as at present. This will mean that the collection and appropriation of taxes on all incomes within the £1 – £300 income bracket whether from paid or self-employment will be a direct responsibility of these authorities.

As this survey has emphasised, the local revenue problems in the Western State are such that existing local revenue sources will be inadequate to provide a final solution. In the light of this, it will be worthwhile for local authorities to exploit the possibility of introducing new bases for local taxation to supplement the existing ones. In this connection, a property rate or tax is the most obvious candidate and having demonstrated its advantages all the local authorities which have a suitable base for this tax should introduce it without delay. The use of loan finance should be made more readily available.

[16]The Public Works Loan Board is an institution primarily financed by the British Exchequer and made accessible to Local Authorities in England and Wales for some proportion of their long-term borrowing. The interest rate on the loans granted is fixed by the British Government.

A lot of difficulties are bound to arise at least initially in trying these supplementary sources. As at present, there seems to be no viable alternative to the local income tax and rates as the major sources of local revenue in the Western State. This being the case, increased financial assistance in the form of larger grants-in-aid from the State Government[17] seems essential. A grant system that is much more positively related partly to revenue and partly to expenditure should be devised. While the former will go a long way to encourage greater local tax effort and consequently improved local revenue performance, the latter will more meaningfully relate State assistance to local needs.

[17]The persistently increasing expenditure/revenue gap so clearly revealed by this study represents the difference between recurrent expenditure and revenue only, and is largely the result of the more rapid growth rate of the former. There are no overdrafts, neither are loans included in the gap. The Local Government Authorities have, however, managed to keep going by special subsidies or deficiency payments made by the State Government. For example, the State Government had always stood ready (until the responsibility for the provision of urban water supply was transferred from the local authorities to the newly established State Water Corporation) to make good any amount by which water rate collections fall short of the cost of providing the service.

Note: (i) The author wishes to state that the Institute of Administration at Ife shares no responsibility for the opinions expressed in this article, for these and any errors contained, he accepts full responsibility.

(ii) To table 2, page 213 the following column is added:
Aggregate Revenue at constant prices — Charge in % terms 185.7, 209.8, —84.7, —52.8, 118.0, total 109.3.

Quarterly Notes

UNITED NATIONS – *Technical Assistance in Public Administration*
(contributed by Raymond Nottage)

The General Assembly of the United Nations and the Secretary General have for many years been acutely aware of the need of many developing countries to improve their administrative capabilities if they are to carry forward with all possible speed the schemes of economic and social development on which they wish to embark. Public administration is therefore one of the key areas of U.N. technical assistance, and the Public Administration Division in the New York headquarters has been extremely active in recent years under the vigorous leadership of its Director Dr. C. Y. Wu.

In January 1967 the Secretary General invited experts from a number of countries, both developing and developed, to review the strategy the U.N. were following in regard to public administration improvement schemes, and to prepare a report for submission to the Economic and Social Council and, through them, to the General Assembly. This meeting of experts, which was under the chairmanship of A. L. Adu of Ghana, produced a report which lead to some strengthening of the U.N.s efforts in this area of its endeavour.

A second meeting of experts was convened for January, 1971 to review the progress of the preceding four years and the proposed objectives and programmes in public administration for the United Nations Second Development Decade, including proposals for a co-ordinated programme of international activities in the field of public administration. This meeting, which took place under the chairmanship of Dr. Kazemzadeh, Minister of State and Secretary-General of State Organization for Administration and Employment Affairs in Iran, was attended by nearly twenty experts from various countries representative of the different regions and administrative systems of the world, and was assisted by representatives from the U.N. Regional Economic Commissions and the specialised agencies most concerned with problems of public administration.

This second meeting, like the first, was much impressed by the disparity between the need of the developing countries for better administration and the relatively small resources that are available to meet it. The meeting therefore urged once again the claims of public administration for increased support from U.N. funds and, indeed, from such other sources as this might be obtained. The experts' report will be submitted to the Economic and Social Council of the U.N., and will no doubt be obtainable from the Public Administration Division, New York.

ZAMBIA – *1969 Census Report*
(contributed by C. Stephen Lombard)

Dr. Patrick Ohadike's article entitled "Counting Heads in Africa: the experience of Zambia, 1963 and 1969" appeared in the October 1970 Number of this Journal. Since the article was written further details have been obtained

from the 1969 Census figures and Stephen Lombard of the Natural Resources Development College, Lusaka, has contributed the following information:

Some results contained in the first report

The 1969 Census shows that the *total* population of Zambia in 1969 was 4,056,995. This is a rate of growth of 2.5 per cent per annum, and an overall increase of 16.2 per cent over the previous 6 years and 2 months. The density of population as a whole is 14 per square mile.[1] Twenty-eight per cent, that is 1,146,000 live in the main urban districts.[2] Forty per cent of Zambia's population lives in a belt 25 miles each side of the line of rail.

The crude birth rate is found to be 42 per 1,000 population, and the crude death rate, 17 per 1,000 population. The estimated infant mortality amongst children under one year is 16.0 per cent, while the life expectancy at birth, is 47 years.

Population changes have been different in various parts of Zambia. There has been considerable movement of population *within* Zambia. About one-third of the people were enumerated in districts other than their districts of birth. A person with formal education showed greater tendency to move to another district. The urban population has grown at a fast rate. The money economy is centred in the Central and Copperbelt Provinces. The Copperbelt Province recorded increases of 50.0 per cent and the Central Province 41.2 per cent, over the 1963 census. The outlying Laupula and Northern Provinces showed *declines* of 5.9 per cent and 3.4 per cent respectively.

During the last 6 years the exodus of people from most remote rural districts outside the line of rail to the line of rail has been dramatic. As a rough guide one can say that any district where the population increase has been less than 16.0 per cent has lost some of its people to another area.

A shift of population from depressed economic areas to more favourable ones is not unusual. Income and job opportunities have increased relatively more in urban areas than in rural areas in the last 6 years. Most farmers in Zambia have suffered from adverse terms of trade. At a rural development seminar held in March 1970, President Kaunda pointed out that the income ratio of roughly 1 to 13 in favour of the urban sector in 1964/65 had changed to 1 to 18 in favour of urban incomes by 1970. Rapidly increasing prices for consumer goods and cost of producer prices, on the other, make farming not a very attractive proposition.

Besides the important changes in the African population, there have been interesting changes in the Non-African population. The number of Asians have *increased* from 7,790 in 1961 to 10,785 in 1969. The total number of Europeans have *decreased* between 1961 and 1969. In 1961 there were 74,549 Europeans living in Zambia; in 1969 43,390. Although the number of Europeans have decreased there has not been a corresponding decrease in

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[1] In Kenya it is 34 per square mile, 90 in Malawi, 26 in Tanzania, 16 in Congo, and 24 in Rhodesia.

[2] Zambia is one of the most "urbanised" countries in Africa. The percentage of urban population in neighbouring countries is approximately 2.8 per cent in Uganda, 6.0 per cent in Kenya, 4.7 per cent in Tanzania, 3.5 per cent in Malawi, and 2.4 per cent in Burundi, according to M. Shaffer in P. F. McLoughlin, *Agriculture in East and Central Africa, An Overview*, (Longman, Nairobi, 1970).

European employment. There were 30,826 Europeans in employment in 1961, as against 23,635 in 1969. Many of the older and larger European families have left Zambia, and these have been replaced by younger, and smaller families.

Non-Zambian citizens accounted for 4.6 per cent of the population. Malawi accounts for the largest group of non-Zambian citizens, followed by Rhodesia, United Kingdom, Tanzania and South Africa. Among the non-Zambian citizens, there is a much higher proportion of people with technical or higher education.

Information on economic characteristics is likely to be unreliable, according to the authors of the first report on the 1969 Census. 156,862 people were said to be self-employed, 398,350 were employees, 13,093 employers, and 124,930 unpaid family workers. Agriculture is said to account for 43.8 per cent of the total working population.

UNITED NATIONS – *UNITAR Symposium on International Law*

The final sessions of the Regional Symposium on International Law for Africa, organized in Accra, Ghana, from 14-28 January 1971 by the United Nations Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR), concentrated on Africa's traditions, concepts and experience in international law.

Government representatives, international officials, jurists and other scholars were involved for the first time in considering Africa's contribution to the development of international law. Inter alia they drew attention to the need for further research in this field. No decisions or resolutions were adopted as the Symposium was intended as a forum for an informal exchange of opinion.

The meeting was held in the Conference Room of State House, Accra, and opened on 14 January 1971, with statements being made by Kwesi Lamptey, Acting Prime Minister of Ghana, and Chief S.O. Adebo, Executive Director of UNITAR.

In the organization of the Symposium, which forms part of the United Nations Programme of Assistance in the Teaching, Study, Dissemination and Wider Appreciation of International Law, UNITAR benefited from the co-operation of the Office of Legal Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat, the Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) and the World Bank (IBRD).

The agenda of the Symposium included the following subjects:

—State Succession in matters other than treaties;

—economic development agreements;

—the pre-colonial and present day contribution of Africa to International Law.

Source: UN Office of Public Information

UNITED NATIONS – *Administrative Obstacles to Development Posed at ECA Seminar, December 1970.*

(i) Was the existing planning machinery we had established too sophisticated for the level of expertise which was available especially in the areas of implementation?

(ii) Could it, therefore, be said that the planners and the executors were operating at different wavelengths, both in the concept of planning and implementation and in the instruments of achieving development objectives?

(iii) Could it be that the planners were struggling to get away from the realities of the administrative situations of the countries for which they were planning?

(iv) Was there adequate consultation between the planners and the executors both at the planning and implementation stages?

(v) Did the procedures and organizations exist for this dialogue and for a proper reporting system on implementation?

(vi) Did socio-economic planning and administrative planning go hand in hand as integral parts of national development?

INTERNATIONAL – *IULA Congress* 1971

The 20th World Congress of the International Union of Local Authorities will meet in Toronto, Canada, from 18 to 23 July, 1971 to discuss the role of local government as promoter of economic and social development. The Congress is expected to be attended by over 1,000 representatives of local governments from all parts of the world.

The Congress will be concerned with the interrelationship between national, regional and local policies for economic and social development. It will discuss the contribution which local government can make as "partner in progress", as well as the implications of such a role for the structure, finances and administrative capabilities of local units. Working groups will deal with the subjects of Local Government and Environment, Social Development Policies, Economic Development Policies, and Financing Development. Plenary sessions will be devoted to such subjects as Regional Government in Toronto and elsewhere in Canada, and the Use of Computers in Decision-Making.

Prior to the Congress participants will receive a report on the Congress theme, containing papers by Dr. Antoni R. Kuklinski, Program Director of the U.N. Research Institute for Social Development in Geneva, Dr. Lauchlin Curry, Professor of Economics at the Simon Frazer University in Burnaby, Canada, and Dr. Henry Maddick, Director of the Institute of Local Government Studies at the University of Birmingham.

The Congress is being organised by IULA in co-operation with the Municipality of Metropolitan Toronto and the Canadian Federation of Mayors and Muncipalities. It is co-sponsored by the Government of Ontario and the Government of Canada.

BRITAIN – *Town and Country Planning, Overseas Summer School* 1971
(contributed by Mr. G. H. Franklin)

The 1971 Overseas Summer School will be held at Southampton University from 9 to 12 September. Each Summer the Town and Country Planning

Summer School is held at a British University, under the auspices of the Town Planning Institute.

The School consists of two parts, the MAIN School which is principally concerned with physical planning and its application within the United Kingdom, and the OVERSEAS School which deals with the special needs and problems of developing countries. The Overseas School, which usually has a membership of fifty to sixty is of particular value in that it provides an almost unique opportunity for planners, administrators, educators, students and others engaged or interested in planning overseas to discuss problems of common concern, to share experiences and exchange opinions.

The Overseas School usually adopts an overall theme for its programme, a number of main papers and case studies are presented, and opportunity is given for the discussion of papers and case studies, as well as other subjects of particular interest to members of the School. The themes adopted during the past three years have been "the place of housing in the national plan", "planning for rural development" and "physical planning in the development process". The theme for the 1971 Overseas School will be MANAGEMENT IN THE PLANNING PROCESS, and an attempt will be made in the four main papers to deal with this subject at national, regional, metropolitan and community levels.

The postal strike has made the organization of the 1971 programme even more difficult than usual, but it is hoped that Professor B. Malicz of "threshold theory" fame will present the first paper on the Polish experience with planning management at the national level. Mr. E. A. K. Kalitsi, Director of the Volta River Authority Ghana, has agreed to deal in the second paper with the regional aspects of management; Mr. M. G. Kutty, Commissioner of the Calcutta Development Authority, has promised to prepare a paper on planning management at the metropolitan level, and in the fourth paper Mr. Pat Crook, formerly with the United Nations, will draw on his considerable experience with Latin American communities.

The main papers will be supported by four case studies which will also follow the same theme. Mr. Morris Juppenlatz, now with Edinburgh University after his return from four years service with the United Nations in Brazil, will discuss aspects of his work with the National Housing Bank of Brazil. Professor Gerald Dix will present "The Cyprus Project – Nottingham University's contribution to Technical Co-operation", which will be based on four years' association with the Cyprus Department of Town Planning and Housing in the preparation of physical development plans for the Island. Mr. Graeme Shankland's case study will set out the need for "New Agencies and Methods for Management and Promotion", illustrated from the experience of Shankland/Cox and Associates as planning consultants in Jamaica, France and elsewhere. The fourth case study, the only one directly related to British experience but relevant also to the developing regions of the world, will be that of Mr. Francis Amos, City Planning Officer of Liverpool, who will deal with "New Dimensions of Planning – a Synthesis of Corporate, Social and Physical Planning in Liverpool".

Full particulars about the Summer School can be obtained from the Secretary, Town Planning Institute, 26 Portland Place, London W1N 4BE.

Book Reviews

Towards Full Employment: Report of an Inter-Agency Mission to Colombia (Chairman, Dudley Seers); *I.L.O. Geneva*, 1970; Appendices, diagrams, tables; pp. 470; £1.60.

Colombia, in common with many underdeveloped countries has been finding increasing difficulty in providing employment or other "gainful occupation" for its rapidly growing population. This has been perplexing to economists who have always assumed that provided G.N.P. was growing fast enough, employment would take care of itself. The novelty of this Report, written under the auspices of the I.L.O. by a visiting mission of no less than 27 members under the chairmanship of Dudley Seers, is that it proposes a strategy for economic development that is couched *not* in terms of maximizing G.N.P. – the concept scarcely receives so much as a mention – but in terms of eliminating unemployment by 1985. The aim of the strategy is to create five million jobs which the Report estimates is the number required to ensure the elimination of present unemployment, plus those needed by the annual 3½ per cent increase of the labour force resulting from the high growth rate of population. The strategy leaves no facet of economic or social policy untouched. It pitches mercilessly into the failure to control the population explosion and no less so at the system of land tenure which reserves ownership and therefore access to land to a minority of wealthy landlords. It does not mince its words about the effect which the crass inequality of income and wealth have had on employment by directing consumer expenditure towards imports or capital-intensive import substituting industries which create few jobs. It also shows, interestingly, how the effect of the Labour laws has been to create a small oligarchy of well paid workers, and how they make it more advantageous to employers to keep numbers small and obtain extra work through overtime than to employ more workers at standard rates of pay.

Visiting missions, especially under United Nations auspices, do not always speak their minds so openly about social and political issues like the inequality of wealth and land ownership, nor is it beyond dispute that it is either proper or efficacious to talk about "the rich" when one is, after all, a foreigner, however distinguished. But if one is asked what to do about unemployment, as the Colombian Government did, one cannot escape pointing out that some social and political policies are incompatible with a solution to the problem one has been asked to investigate.

The Colombian Mission Report appears to have "de-throned" G.N.P. from its position of pre-eminence among the objectives of economic development. But this appearance is deceptive since the truth of the matter is that to maximize employment is probably also going to maximize income in the long run simply by the increase in purchasing power that it brings about. Contrary to the belief of the doyen development theorists, future consumption is *not* necessarily enhanced by present abstinence, and the exhortations to save and to funnel resources into the hands of Governments and entre-

preneurs has often done no more than create an illusion of development without really raising standards of life. This Mission has at last recognized that widespread gains in incomes will do more than forced saving to enhance meaningful development. The Report also attacks another favourite assumption of development economics viz. that policies are to be judged by whether or not they enhance the sacred cow of "productivity". With exemplary lucidity it shows that what matters is to increase *output* and that ordinarily it is only when there is full employment that an increase in productivity is the best way of obtaining a rise in output. So long as there are people without jobs, increases in output can be obtained more cheaply by giving the unemployed the opportunity to work. This Report will be read with interest by many who know nothing about Colombia.

WALTER ELKAN

Studies in Nigerian Administration, Ed., D. J. MURRAY; *Hutchinson*, 1970; £3.75, paperback £1.75.

This is another valuable publication from the recent Adedeji-Murray team at the Institute of Administration of the University of Ife (cf. this *Journal*, Oct. 1969, pp. 291-4 and Oct. 1970, pp. 300-3).

This volume does not purport to be a comprehensive text on the working of Nigerian administration but rather brings together eight full-length essays as a retrospective assessment of Nigeria's first decade of independence in the field of public administration. The contributors fasten on three foci: the formal structure of administration, policies for staffing the public services, and the social ecology in which administration has to operate. These analyses in depth are thus complementary to such standard general studies of Nigerian administration as E. M. Awa's *Federal Government in Nigeria* (1964) and L. F. Blitz's edited *The Politics and Administration of Nigerian Government* (1965) or to such case-studies as A. Adedeji's *Nigerian Federal Finance* (1969), D. J. Murray's *The Work of Administration in Nigeria* (1969) and S. Humes' forthcoming *Local Government in Western Nigeria.*

What is at once significant and encouraging is that out of the eight contributors, five carried out their research under the auspices of Ife's Institute of Administration and three-quarters of the papers were the by-product of work submitted for higher degrees there. Professor Adedeji's hope that the publications coming out from his Institute may soon break through the sound-barrier of communication and so reach the policy-makers instead of being "buried in theses and dissertations" or confined to journals "which at best have very limited circulation in Nigeria and at worst never reach the country" looks like being realized. If so, Nigerian administrators will not be alone in their gratitude to this Institute for its continuing and consistently admirable programme of research and publication.

So diverse are the topics selected by the contributors that it will be helpful in a review of the book for a Journal of this spread of readership to itemise the contents. At the macronational level we have two essays. Professor

Murray puts forward a comparative analysis of Nigerian field administration, taking 1952 as his baseline and perceptively discussing the administrative changes effected in each of the four Regions. If observers were struck by the continuity of administrative thought in Nigeria up to 1967, even within the context of change induced by a strong measure of politicisation, it is by no means axiomatic that the new State governments, for all their current modification of the traditional Native Authority system of local administration, will – or ever need to – make a clean break with the inherited, proven and long-favoured role of the vital field agent. Richard Harris examines the role of the higher public service, interpreted by themselves as well as by other members of the Western-educated élite, as it was reflected in the bureaucratic governance and development of the country in 1964-65. His findings are derived from answers to a questionnaire completed by 300 bureaucrats, 270 elitist professionals and 200 politicians! His conclusion that Nigeria's civil servants were "not consistently performing their role in the prescribed non-partisan manner" need surprise no one aware of the political and even social pressures to which so many were so often exposed. It does, however, reinforce the growing acceptance of the role concept as a positive unit of analysis in the wider study of political behaviour.

Turning to more specific essays, we have O. Nwanwene's objectively close anatomy of the Public Service Commissions; a discussion of personal tax administration by G. M. Walker; Owodunni Teriba writing on accountability and control of statutory corporations; a microstudy of work and motivation among agricultural extension workers right down at the grassroots level; and Fred Fletcher's admirably documented enquiry into the civil service's problem child, the executive class. Neither the Public Service Commissions nor the Executive Grade emerge as a success in the story of Nigeria's public administration. Nwanwene finds the former to have been unresisting agencies for achieving the policies of the politicians. Fletcher judges the latter to be in need of extensive reform unless the executive class, whose contribution could be so vital to the country's administration, is to be written off as a glorious half-cock failure.

This leaves one chapter, the first in the book: Ladipo Adamolekun's comparative examination of the structure and efficiency of top-level ministerial organization in the bureaucracies of Nigeria and the Ivory Coast. He underlines the merit of the francophone model of the Ministerial Cabinet and while admitting the influential impact of imperial rule on the ecology of public administration, he suggests that the time has now come for independent anglophone nations at least to examine the workings of the *cabinet* system (a theme already endorsed in these pages by Mr. Adamolekun and by this reviewer: Journal, October 1969, pp. 235-242 and p. 293), and unprejudicedly to consider whether transplanting or selective grafting might not be of benefit. For academics free from administrative traditions, Mr. Adamolekun's arguments are compelling. One can but hope, sharing Professor Adedeji's wish, that they will receive the attention they deserve from some of Nigeria's competent cadre of experienced bureaucrats.

Some of these essays may acquire an unanticipated historical component. So drastic, in the context of Nigeria's administrative principles, has been

the creation of the country's present twelve states that studies of public administration undertaken after 1968 (when the States came into effective being) are likely to require and seek some very different fundamentals of fact and of assumption. With this evaluation of past practice so ably to hand, the current rethinking and overhaul of public administration in post-war, State-structured Nigeria is made measurably easier.

A. H. M. KIRK-GREENE

Cities in Transformation—The Urban Squatter Problem of the Developing World, MORRIS JUPPENLATZ, *University of Queensland Press*, pp. 218 +47; £2.80.

This book is a welcome and valuable addition to literature on one of the world's major and most urgent problems, the too-rapid and unbalanced urban growth in developing countries. Its author, an architect-planner, was trained during the early 1950's in the techniques of collaborative, comprehensive planning, under E. A. A. Rowse at the School of Planning and Research for Regional Development, London. Morris Juppenlatz speaks with authority, based on his own convictions, and his long experience of the housing and urbanization problems of developing countries, gained during his service with the United Nations in the Philippines and Brazil.

At the beginning of the first United Nations Development Decade (1960-1970) it was estimated that over 200 million new inhabitants would crowd into the cities of the developing world by 1970. This enormous increase – in spite of its magnitude – is only a beginning, for the great majority of people in developing countries still live in rural, and normally socially and economically deprived areas.

The view has all too often been expressed that nothing should be done to prevent or slow down the movement of people from rural areas into the urban concentrations where they can form the basis for industrialization and, in consequence, economic growth. Unfortunately, little mention is usually made of the inability of existing urban administrations and structures to cope with any large influx of people, and the social evils which result from such a policy.

Morris Juppenlatz supports the opposite view; that economic policies must have social objectives, that population movements can be influenced and guided, can be combined with a greater utilization of a nation's resources, and can lead to a more balanced form of urban growth, and a more equable distribution of increasing national wealth.

This book, which is well illustrated, defines the urban squatter problem, discusses ways in which it can be tackled, and presents a detailed case study of squatter relocation which the author helped to initiate in the Philippines. It then examines urban squatting and the whole urbanization process in its historical context, and advocates policies which would lead to a more rational balance of population and development between urban and rural areas.

Two appendices provide – (*a*) notes on the design of a preliminary urban data collation system on which comparative urbanization trends for various towns and cities could be analysed, and (b) a summary of the procedure which could be used for identifying and quantifying the squatter problem in a town.

This book will be of particular value to all professionals, administrators, teachers, research workers and others, both within and outside government service, who are actively involved in the planning and housing problems of developing countries. It should also be read by all who are interested in, and concerned about those who form the under-privileged majority of the world community, for it is largely upon this majority, and whether or not its essential needs are met, that future peace, stability and progress will depend.

GEORGE FRANKLIN

Construction in Overseas Development, by CHARLES COBURN; *Overseas Development Institute, London;* pp. 35; 65 p.

As Mr. Coburn explains, his paper is mainly a restatement of the problem of Construction in Overseas Development as it was described at a series of seminars which were organized by the Overseas Development Institute in London. In it, he has brought together thoughts there expressed on the needs of the Construction Industry in the developing countries and ideas arising from the discussions which took place between December, 1968 and April, 1969.

Whilst it is mentioned that the talks were attended by representatives of the British Construction Industry, the Architectural and Engineering Professions both in public employment and private practice, groups with export promotion interests and economists whose main concern was with development planning, no indication is given that those with immediate responsibility for the planning of National programmes in the developing countries, took any part in the discussions. Whether they did or not, the impression left by the paper is one of a degree of shadow boxing arising from a lack of a true insight into or sympathy with the needs and thinking of the developing countries themselves.

The recommendations arising from the discussions have been summarised and these indicate the general ways in which progress can be made. One of these lists seven ways in which Governments of developing countries should be encouraged to use their influence to create conditions for the modernization of construction practice. These recommendations are in general terms and as such appropriate whether one is dealing with a developing country or one already used to a more sophisticated approach – it depends only on the degree of development already achieved to lay down the starting point. This must be done realistically against the whole background of the country's needs politically and economically and here again there arises the niggling doubt whether the problems facing the receivers of aid have been fully appreciated.

A particular instance of the grounds for such doubts is in the statement that "... revision of the role and responsibilities of the public works department by government amounts to putting its own house in order, and is one of its most urgent remedial tasks". Any alteration of the role must be preceded by other action and is dependent on the development locally of

effective consultancy services and a construction industry together with the acceptance of the recommendations made in the paper in accordance with the best interests of the developing countries. That changes in the actual organizations may be desirable is recognized already as is evidenced by the fact that studies for their future development have been carried out in at least thirteen countries during the past few years and are now in course of implementation. The responsibilities of the departments dealing with "works" dealing with engineering and building and planning matters will not change. What will change is the manner in which these responsibilities are exercised, and, here again must depend upon the developments envisaged by the paper taking place first.

Throughout the discussions described in the paper, it would seem that little thought has been given to the question of what is an appropriate rate of progress in any of the directions mentioned under the conditions prevailing in the developing countries. Rather, the impression is given that concentration has occurred on how they can be provided most quickly with all those things which those attending the seminars considered good for them. For this reason, whilst the recommendations made are undoubtedly useful, for them to be of real value they must be applied against a background of understanding of the difficulties under which the developing countries are working and progressing. There must be no attempt to impose them in ignorance of that background. Implementation must be worked out as a joint exercise by the provider and receiver of aid and can never succeed without this joint approach and understanding.

F. H. WOODROW

The Administrative Process in Britain, by R. G. S. BROWN; *Methuen* 1970; pp. 349; £3.75. (Paperback £1.30).

R. G. S. Brown, the author of *The Administrative Process in Britain*, is now Senior Lecturer in Social Administration in the University of Hull, but for a number of years was a member of the administrative class of the civil service. He thus brings to his task a wider experience than do most academic authors of books on this subject.

A large part of this new volume is, in fact, about the civil service, with a brief introduction covering the reforms stemming from Northcote/Trevelyan Report of 1855 and the developments of the subsequent hundred years. It continues with a description of the salient features of the civil service as it was in the 1960's and an account, and some assessment, of the main proposals of the Fulton Committee on the Civil Service. A significant part is devoted, however, to questions related to the machinery of government and to a discussion of the contribution that management theory might make to the improvement of decision making in government.

Mr. Brown takes his illustrations mainly from the administration of the social and economic services – the area of his experience as well as of his main interest. These services have undergone something of a transformation, however, with the change of Government in 1970. Likewise, the Fulton

Report, on which incidentally Mr. Brown expresses some pointed criticism, does not now hold the centre of the stage in the way it did when Mr. Harold Wilson was Prime Minister. Mr. Heath and his colleagues look much more to the practical experience of businessmen than to the learning of university dons. There is to be less government intervention in industry, and there are to be fewer civil servants. The political mood has therefore somewhat changed since Mr. Brown conceived and wrote his book, and the reader who is not familiar with daily political events in Britain should bear this in mind.

Since management theory has been evolved mainly in studies of industrial organization, it might be thought that a Conservative Government which extols the virtue of the business man would find management theory a useful tool to advance its purposes. It is hard to believe, however, that the three chapters in this book in Part II dealing with Theory will lead Ministers and their senior civil servants seriously to consider abandoning their present modes of thought in regard to the means of organizing the government machine.

Although this book suffers from a certain diffusion of purpose, and may prove to have been written at an awkward time in the country's political and administrative development, it contains useful descriptions of salient features of the civil service as it existed before the appointment of the Fulton Committee. Also, the author brings a constructive as well as a critical mind to bear on major questions of government organization and management, questions which will no doubt beset us for a long time to come.

RAYMOND NOTTAGE

Politics in Sierra Leone, by JOHN R. CARTWRIGHT, *University of Toronto Press,* 1970; pp. VIII and 296; £7.25.

One of the major difficulties of writing about African affairs is the speed with which the scene changes. Dr. Cartwright describes the history of events in Sierra Leone down to the fall of Sir Albert Margai in 1967. Siaka Stevens had been arrested, the Army had taken over, and Tejan-Sie installed as Governor General. But he had to add an epilogue recording that in April 1968, the Army officers had been imprisoned by the N.C.O's and Siaka Stevens reinstated as Prime Minister. Now (in April 1971) the picture has changed again; the new Army Commander has been arrested, troops of the Guinean Army called in to protect the Prime Minister, and Tejan-Sie sent into exile. One has to run very fast to keep up with events.

Dr. Cartwright's account of the politics in Sierra Leone in the eventful twenty years 1947-67 is based on much detailed research and careful study. He gives a very clear and fluent account of the events that led up to the shaping of the Constitution and the grant of independence, and then of the almost fratricidal struggles between Sir Milton and Sir Albert Margai. It is a straightforward historical account, unclouded by excessive involvement with methodology and theorizing. After other recent works on Sierra Leone, the difference is particularly marked, and welcome.

Such speculation and theorizing as Dr. Cartwright allows himself is restricted to a final, tentative chapter, in which he is mostly concerned with the problem of how the ruling group, or élite, based on the chiefly families of the Provinces, managed to keep its power so long. To some observers the problem may seem to be the opposite – why did it lose its grip so quickly? But for much of the period which Dr. Cartwright describes, the major question seemed to be how long the Creoles could retain their predominance over the people of the Provinces. But this question Dr. Cartwright tends to ignore, and indeed he shows surprisingly little interest in the Creoles and their position at all. His attitude is justified by the event of their loss of power and influence, but at the time they seemed, and were, of major importance.

One could wish also that there had been included more discussion, in the light of subsequent events, of the wisdom or folly of the British Colonial policy. Dr. Cartwright scarcely considers this, and never mentions the famous Creech Jones Dispatch of 1947. Yet the whole story he tells is set in the content of British determination to hand over control to a democracy based on the Westminster model. But was it sense to think that this could work against a background of Tribalism and of conflict between Creoles and "up country men"? Was it really wise to introduce an electoral system, complete with ballot boxes, ballot paper accounts and Rules and Regulations from the Representation of the People Acts, without providing for the influence of the great secret societies, Porro, Bundu and Wunde, and the power of the Sacred Bush? But what else, in all the circumstances, could we have done?

On one point of emphasis one may question Dr. Cartwright's interpretation of events. He describes, in chapter five, the revolt of 1956 of the Northern people against their chiefs, and the subsequent Cox inquiry, which discloses how wide was the gulf between the chiefs and the commoners, and how little this gulf had been observed by politicians or administrators. Then, in chapter six, he describes the appointment, two years before, of the Commission on Electoral Reform. The impression is thus given that this split between the chiefs and commoners was already apparent in 1964, and was much more important at that time than the split between the Colony and the Protectorate. But it did not seem so at the time.

Taken by and large, this is a really good piece of historical writing, giving an accurate and balanced account of events, without forcing the facts to fit into a preconceived conceptual framework, or confusing the reader with the patois of political scientists.

BRYAN KEITH LUCAS

Kalahari Village Politics: An African Democracy, by ADAM KUPER, *Cambridge Studies in Social Anthropology* 3, *Cambridge University Press, Cambridge,* 1970; pp. xii, 191; £3.50.

Africanist social anthropologists have already given us *An African Aristocracy* (Hilda Kuper on the Swazi) and a *Bantu Bureaucracy* (Fallers on the Basoga of Uganda); now Adam Kuper offers us *An African Democracy*. His sub-title is apt. This short but solid monograph is a workmanlike account of the

functioning of local government at the grass roots level in the village of Kuli, a predominantly Ngologa (Kgalagari-speaking Bantu) community in the Ghanzi district of western Botswana. The author stresses that his study is of "contemporary social life and politics"; i.e. the situation as it was when he was there in 1963-64 and 1966-67, just before and after Independence. This approach is perhaps slightly less of an innovation than he seems to think it is (apart from the work of the "Manchester School" in Central Africa, to which he refers, the contributors to, for example, *East African Chiefs* were reporting on political relationships as they were when they studied them), but the analysis he provides is both thorough and convincing.

For the Ngologa as for other Southern Bantu, popular representation in local government was traditionally – and continues to be – achieved through council membership, the key decision-making body in Kuli being the village headman in council. The inner core of the council, representing the mainly kinship-based factions which make up the village, Dr. Kuper refers to as the "village authority". As elsewhere in Africa the headman played a dual role, acting both as local leader (though here his part was rather democratically to express consensus than to "rule" in his own right; ideally at council meetings "everyone present should speak"), and, at least until Independence, as representative of and means of communication with the central government. As might be expected, before Independence he was more effective in the former than in the latter role, and Dr. Kuper shows how, with the establishment of District Councils in 1966, the local District Councillor (a "New Man", literate and English-speaking) has largely taken over the sphere of extra-village relations. For example he and not the headman takes the chair at council meetings where "modern" issues of district-wide concern are being considered. Though the future of the traditional headman, like that of chiefs in other parts of Africa, is uncertain, this innovation seems, paradoxically, to have in some ways strengthened rather than weakened his position, for it relieves him, at least in part, of the dilemma of having personally to reconcile the "universalistic" demands of the new technocracy with the traditional "particularistic" claims of his local community.

Of particular interest are Dr. Kuper's detailed analyses of the different extent to which the various categories of members of the council contribute to its debates, of the types of issues discussed, and of the kinds of legal cases decided. This is indeed, as one of the author's chapter headings suggests, "the stuff of politics". Also well brought out, and aptly illustrated by case material, is the way in which local, inter-faction conflict is generated by internal issues (such as the administration of the local borehole), while village unity is characteristically achieved in external relations, for example with the district administration, with which communication was poor at least until the establishment of district councils in 1966.

Dr. Kuper has given us an up-to-the-minute analysis of social and political change in a small-scale African community. He manages, with only one or two lapses, to avoid jargon. His book is a valuable addition to the growing body of professional writing on the micro-politics of what used to be called "tribal Africa".

J. H. M. Beattie

Settlement Schemes in Tropical Africa, by ROBERT CHAMBERS; *Routledge & Kegan Paul,* tables, maps, plates, bibliography, index; pp. 294; £2.75.

By 1967 1,700 tenant farmers and their families were producing over 14,000 tons of paddy on the Mwea settlement scheme, some 50 miles North-East of Nairobi, between the Thana and Thiba rivers. In twenty years a desolate and inhospitable area had become an agricultural/irrigation success story. Dr. Chambers who has had considerable Kenya experience, provides a detailed study of the scheme written in a lively, forthright style.

The scheme got under way during the Mau Mau emergency with its cataclystic effect on government policies; staff and funds were made available for development and there was a strong impetus from government to achieve rapid progress. As the emergency waned so could "consent by compulsion" be used to force through policies which in other circumstances would have met with obdurate opposition (eg. land consolidation; optimal coffee-growing methods; detainee labour at Mwea and control there of early Kikuyu settlers). Where political clashed with technical considerations, pressure for speed was likely to win; with major political issues a daily burden at the centre, the amateur flair of the managers and the professional skill of the technicians, despite friction and difficulties, enjoyed fairly free rein. (Dr. Chambers brings out very clearly the personal and personnel aspects of running the scheme with much skill) and their efforts were sufficiently co-ordinated to keep the scheme moving. Men were involved who were prepared to take decisions even though some of their colleagues differed. Considerable difficulties were overcome or by-passed because "activists" were not deterred by opposition and did not have to await consensus or "voluntary" consent; resort was made to "ad hockery" rather than to headquarters. One Colonial Office adviser, an engineer, wrote in the mid-fifties: "The Mwea-Tebere project presents exceedingly unusual features inasmuch as the project has been undertaken before topographical surveys have been completed, before water requirements have been estimated, and before a soil survey has been made. Add to this the fact that no headworks have been constructed and that no engineering plans, as I understand them, are available, and my task as an engineer on being asked to comment on the project can be appreciated. This is the only project I have encountered where labour has been imported into the area and attempts made at canal construction before the collection of all essential information without which it is impossible to produce a really satisfactory engineering project".

Many settlement schemes dependent, as was Mwea, on successful furrow-borne irrigation have failed through want of adequate initial survey, or have failed to start at all because soil surveys have proved unpromising. At Mwea risks were taken, the cause was a good one and the Gods were kind.

The problems of administrative and technical control, the social facets – with local people declining compensation for "our land", the infrastructure for development evolving into the infrastructure for residence, the sideshow of the aqua privies, are all set out by an author whose eye is quick to see the human aspects of each operation undertaken by the scheme. Indeed poli-

tician and planner, administrator and agronome will find much food for thought as Dr. Chambers tells the Mwea story – particularly on the "management" side.

Dr. Chambers looks briefly at a number of other settlement schemes in East, Central and West Africa. Some readers will be a little bewildered as the references jump from place to place, some cursorily, some in a little greater detail, while the author marshals his material for the *dicta* on schemes with which he concludes. "Over-ambitious plans, uneconomic mechanization, headlong implementation, and ignorance and neglect of social factors in settlement, were almost as serious in the first half of the 1960's as they had been in the post-war period". "What is usually needed is gradual experiment and gathering of information, and small pilot projects which include the people to be affected. The discipline and limitations of all this conventional wisdom are as vital now as ever, and must be accepted by politicians and planners alike". All this is very true but will the people who matter, the decision-taking politicians read, learn and inwardly digest?

Officially planned Settlement Schemes in Africa as elsewhere are of different sizes, often designed for different purposes; they fail or succeed for different reasons. The generalizations which Dr. Chambers makes are wisely confined to basic principles – he warns against the attraction of big schemes which tend to tempt political leaders; he emphasises the high opportunity costs of trained staff; he recommends the simplest type of scheme compatible with the particular settlement needs in mind, and flexibility in land tenure arrangements.

This very useful and informative book is centred on the Mwea scheme to which nearly half the contents are devoted, a scheme atypical (in its developmental environment) of those with which varied comparisons are drawn; nonetheless the final conclusions are surely beyond contention: "In the long run the survival of most settlement schemes as identifiable organizations depends more upon their economic strength than upon parental support or protective rationalizations; similarly the survival of most parent organizations depends more upon their overall financial position than upon any other factor. In the short run, personalities, alliances, and passing political influences may be important. But sooner or later, unless a scheme or a programme has become financially sound, awkward economic questions are asked, and the most effective defence against them is evidence of a sound economy. In the very long term, the best assurance of survival is economic viability".

P.H.J.

Other Books Received

REGIONAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT – THE RIVER BASIN APPROACH IN MEXICO, by DAVID BARKIN and TIMOTHY KING; *Cambridge University Press*, 1970; maps, tables, appendices, index; pp. 262; £3.25.

More than a third of Mexico's 35 million people live in the congested central region with a population density of over 250 to the square mile. The Northern region, nearly three times as large, holds some 6 per cent of the population at a density of under 15 to the square mile. The regional disparities are immense. The country itself high and mountainous has relatively little plainland. It is therefore understandable that the last two decades should have seen major steps taken to develop the isolated regions, by harnessing the power of the mountain rivers, by introducing flood control measures and irrigation schemes to open up new lands for settlement as a counter to the ever increasing urbanisation in the populous areas.

The joint-authors in a book derived from their Ph.D theses, study a number of development projects carried out by quasi-autonomous River Basin Commissions (they are responsible to the Minister of Water Resources). The Mexican Revolution came early; land reform began over 50 years ago; there has been well-established political stability under a system whereby for his six year term the President wields strong executive powers. Economically Mexico benefits now from the "tighten-the-belts and no unnecessary imports" policy of the immediate post-oil nationalisation era.

The projects examined have, inevitably, had a mixed degree of success, but even in the Papaloapan basin – a relative failure, agricultural productivity has expanded greatly. Ejido-held and privately-held farmlands are producing more and contributing to Mexico's enviable viability. There may well be a major lesson here which other Latin American countries could learn to their advantage – how to provide positive inducements so as to breakdown regional inequalities and relieve urban congestion.

THE POLITICS OF CONFORMITY IN LATIN AMERICA, Ed. CLAUDIO VELIZ; *Oxford University Press*, 1971; appendix, index; pp. 291; £1.00.

Planned as "The Politics of Change" this volume of essays on Latin America became "The Politics of Conformity . . ."! Despite a wide consensus throughout the continent that radical reform to the institutional structure of society was a pre-requisite to real economic and social development, the past two decades have seen little result from the efforts of would-be reformers.

To some extent the contributors to this volume undertake a debunking exercise to the theme that the frustration of reformist expectations will not necessarily have explosive social consequences.

The officer corps, so often the coup-makers, are shown as middle-class, favouring neither the landowners nor the populist radicals. Industry has been established without the reforms being implemented that the Alliance for Progress considered prerequisites. In the editor's introductory view, "The politics of conformity which have dominated the last decade have apparently led to the return of a paternalistic centralism" having "much in common with the traditions of the Spanish enlightenment" – hence perhaps the tendency of potential activist reform groups to seek integration within the existing structure of society.

INDUSTRIALIZATION AND TRADE POLICIES – THE PHILIPPINES, by JOHN H. POWER and GERARDO P. SICAT, **TAIWAN,** by MO-HUAN HSING; published on behalf of OECD, Paris, by *Oxford University Press*; Tables, bibliography, index; pp. 324; paperback £2.25, hardback £4.00.

This volume provides two separate books in one. Professors Power and Sicat study the Philippines while in the second part, Professor Mo-Huan Hsing studies Taiwan. In common both countries suffered severe disruption to their economies during

World War II. Their recovery and subsequent economic development have differed greatly. Taiwan separated by a narrow sea from the Chinese Peoples Republic has received massive aid from the United States (totally in diverse forms between 1951 and 1965 nearly $1,500 million—Table 4.1). Despite the agricultural nature of the Island and arable land limited to some 3,500 square miles, the economic growth achieved and sustained has been considerable. Prof. Hsing draws attention to sluggishness in the technological field and to further economic progress he recommends more research and technical improvements; increased training and better marketing and information services; improved infrastructure; relaxed restrictions which protect local industry but inhibit efficiency; and the exemption of raw materials from the commodity and auxiliary taxes currently imposed. Seventy-four Tables provide massive sets of trade figures.

Professors Power and Sicat examine the recent economic difficulties of the Philippines following a boom period when traditional exports and finishing stage import-substitution industry boosted an economy which still depends very largely on agriculture, forestry and mining. They consider new directions for industrial growth and regard the removal of biased protection of home industry and peso devaluation as prerequisites. They also emphasise the need for policy change to labour intensive industry in view of the already critical problem of unemployment and an ever increasing population. They advocate a uniform degree of protection for Philippine industries, and they warn against the adverse effects which they fear will accrue if the government fails to resist the pressures now being put upon it to increase the legal minimum wage, to introduce price control, to reduce the quantum of free market rate imports, and to extend the range of exports subject to the special *ad valorem* export tax. The economists may be right, but whether their proposals are practical propositions politically may well be another matter altogether.

COLONIALISM IN AFRICA 1870-1960, Vol. 3; Ed. VICTOR TURNER; *Cambridge University Press;* maps, index; pp. 455; £5.00.

Five anthropologists at American and three at British Universities, join with an American historian, a Professor of Education and a theology lecturer in Britain, and a sociologist at Makerere to provide twelve essays entitled "Profiles of Change: African Society and Colonial Rule".

Professor Gluckman examines rural and urban tribalism. An advocate of early African independence "I felt any foreign domination was immoral . . . Africans have the right to solve their own problems and with time and help they will do so", he believes that Davidson and others have distorted the extent of conflict between black and white, that by and large rural African and White settler each went his way without being affected by conflict in his daily life. Hostilities there were but "a relatively small proportion of the African population was involved in a persistent struggle against the System". He is rather pessimistic about the path that lies ahead and believes "success in the effort to institute new leadership will depend successively . . . on ability to control force and to use the mob in the city or the underprivileged peasants. Dissidence will be increasingly regarded as treasonable."

Professor Lucy Mair studies the old and the new elite and suggests that the descendants of early nationalist leaders may well be cloaked with hereditary authority in the years ahead.

Professor Colson examines the impact of the Colonial period on the definition of land rights and concludes the result has been that "where men were once concerned with the welfare of the community and the appropriate relationships with the earth they were now free to acquire land as an economic good". Space permits mention of only one further essay, the last, by Peter Rigby, whose rather sketchy picture of Ugogo makes only an oblique footnote reference to Job Lusinde and omits reference to Chief Mazengo anointing Dr Nyerere at his installation as President. There is some inaccuracy and some questionable guesswork ("Mgeni" in the District book is just as likely to be an individual's name as that of "stranger" used generally – indeed if one must guess, it could be hazarded that the reference is to very able Chief Mgeni of Singida, if the recollection is correct that he spent a while in Ugogo). It is rather a pity that this book which contains so much interesting and authoritative material should not, if Tanzania were the chosen country, have concluded say with an essay by Gulliver on the Nyakusa.

CHIEF, COUNCIL AND COMMISSIONER, by J. F. HOLLEMAN; *Oxford University Press;* bibliography, index; pp. 351; £2.60.

Professor Holleman was a member of the Mangwenda Reserve Commission of Inquiry and based on the report that followed in 1961, the present volume provides a wide study of African administration in Rhodesia in the immediate pre-UDI era.

If Garfield Todd had remained in office, or if Edgar Whitehead with his relatively liberal programme had won the 1962 election, would the stern paternalistic administrators have proved sufficiently flexible to make "the new line" (of more democratic local administration) really work just as African nationalist fervour was growing? Would European MPs have been much less arrogant towards the African members of the multi-racial Parliament, had the Federal Party stayed in power? Perhaps the wind of change in the form of a very light breeze had come too late anyway to a Rhodesia facing the break-up of the Federation.

Professor Holleman writes with sympathetic understanding of the predicament into which history and its old wrongs had placed upright Rhodesian administrators – local Europeans, in some cases sons of former Commissioners, brought up in an environment that did not encourage flexibility or a really new-look approach to local administration. He looks with justified distaste at the violence and intimidation of nationalist extremists when they broke up local African development projects. But he is under no illusions as to the intransigence of the Rhodesian Frontsmen. He writes in sadness as he had hoped to see progressive local government developed in an atmosphere of reasonable inter-racial trust and goodwill – and appears to believe, optimistically perhaps, that this might have been achieved but for political stresses and strains generated outside the framework of local administration itself. He places rather more store by those "King's men" the Chiefs than the circumstances probably warrant, and too little store on the capacity of African political parties to evolve their own workable local constitutional arrangements (even in Rhodesia notwithstanding ZAPU/ZANU internecine strife), and many are likely to feel that the Doomboshowa Indaba did no more than grant to Rhodesian Chiefs an uncomfortable respite and stored up a still more uncomfortable day of reckoning.

MASS MEDIA AND NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT, by WILBUR SCHRAMM; *Stanford University Press, California*; notes, bibliography, index; pp. 333; $3.25.

This is a new paperback edition of Wilbur Schramm's major work on mass communications, first published in 1964. No doubt much progress has been made over the past five years, nonetheless there must still be many countries that can learn to their advantage from his advocacy of maximisation of mass media methods. Few can doubt that modern means of communication, enabling the transfer of information and of skills to be effected with tremendous speed, if mobilised and used intensively, can help towards rapid economic and social development in a way that fifty years ago would have been the envy of the then most developed nations.

UNDER TWO MASTERS, by N. B. BONARJEE; *Oxford University Press,* 1970; index; pp. 317; £2.80.

The author joined the I.C.S. in 1925 and retired from high office under the independent Government of India 25 years later, to become for six years Chairman of the Union Public Service Commission.

Educated in England, imbued with radical ideas at Oxford that made him something of a rebel as a civil servant under the British Raj, he ends somewhat disillusioned with the politics of nationalism and somewhat nostalgic towards the old days of an alien rule that was based on certain fundamental principles of integrity and impartiality. Politicians "on the make" are an anathema to him, he detested the post-independence corruption he found around him. Perhaps, however, he is less than fair to his own countrymen. Impartial public officers serving honest political masters is not a state of affairs that can be created overnight. The evolution from the nabob era of exploitation to the later period of good governance took a long time under the British Raj, just as it took a long time in Britain itself before social justice became an accepted prerequisite to good government, nor has sainthood yet been achieved.

REGIONAL PLANNING FOR SOCIAL FACILITIES, by SUDAR WANMALI; *National Institute of Community Development, Hyderabad;* maps, tables, bibliography; pp. 94; Rupees 12.00.

This is a case study of Eastern Maharashtra, providing a fairly full description of the regional planning process in operation in an Indian State, as it affects the "hierarchy levels" of settlements, and concentrating on the distribution of social facilities. How far the theoretical framework on which the author bases his study, is really the best means on which to base the planning of settlements in India, must be a matter for debate: if tied too closely to the textbook, then the flexibility required to meet the social needs arising in particular local circumstances will be lacking and the planners' good intentions may well be defeated.

PORTRAIT OF A NATIONALIST, as told to G. R. MUTAHABA; *East Africa Publishing House;* pp. 28; Shs (T) 2.50.

This is the story of a veteran Tanzanian nationalist from Bukoba, who was imprisoned under the colonial regime, placed in preventive detention by the TANU Government in the year of the Mutiny, and finally became a President-nominated MP as a septuagenarian. The volatile Bahaya tend to produce "natural" rebels and Ali Migeyo has been one of them for much of his life.

THE SUDAN, by OLIVER ALBINO; *Oxford University Press for the Institute of Race Relations;* pp. 132; 90 p.

The author is unequivocally a protagonist of the Southern Sudanese. He sees the solution to the North/South problem lying in a decentralised system of administration for the South working where possible through local agencies.

POVERTY IN BRITAIN AND THE REFORM OF SOCIAL SECURITY, by A. B. ATKINSON; *Cambridge University Press;* appendices; pp. 224; £1.00.

The British Welfare State may be a model of its kind and the envy of many other nations, but the author of this study finds much that is inadequate where the low income family is concerned. He suggests various schemes to improve the social security system and in the process very usefully provides an antidote to any complacency now entertained by those responsible for social administration.